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American labor law was designed to ensure equal bargaining power between
workers and employers. But workers’ collective power against increasingly
dominant employers has disintegrated. With union density at an abysmal 6.2
percent in the private sector—a level unequaled since the Great Depression—
the vast majority of workers depend only on individual negotiations with
employers to lift stagnant wages and ensure upward economic mobility. But
decentralized, individual bargaining is not enough. Economists and legal
scholars increasingly agree that, absent regulation to protect workers’ collec-
tive rights, labor markets naturally strengthen employers’ bargaining power
over workers. Existing labor and antitrust law have failed to step in, leaving
employers free to coordinate and consolidate labor-market power while con-
straining workers’ ability to do the same. The dissolution of workers’ collec-
tive rights has resulted in spiking income inequality: workers have suffered
economy-wide wage stagnation and a declining share of the national income
for decades. To resolve this crisis, some scholars have advocated for ambitious
labor law reforms, like sector-wide bargaining, while others have turned to
antitrust law to tackle employer power. While these proposals are vital, they
overlook an existing opportunity already contained in the labor law that
would avoid the political and doctrinal obstacles to such large-scale reforms.
This Article argues for a “structural” approach to the labor law that revives
and modernizes its equal bargaining power purpose through deploying inno-
vative social scientific analysis. A “structural” approach is one that takes into
account workers’ bargaining power relative to employers in determining the
scope of substantive labor rights and in resolving disputes. Because employ-
ers’ current buyer power strengthens their ability to indefinitely hold out on
worker demands in the employment bargain, the “structural” approach seeks
to deploy social scientific tools to tailor the labor law’s provisions so that they
resituate workers to a bargaining position from which they could equally
hold out.
This Article makes three key contributions. First, it documents the dispersion
and misalignment of workers’ collective rights under current labor law, de-
tailing the historical narrowing of workers’ collective rights to limited tactics
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by a small set of workers against highly protected individual enterprises and
the concomitant rise of employer power (Part I). Second, it introduces and
schematizes the wealth of social scientific literature relevant for evaluating
the relative bargaining power of employers and employees (Part II). And fi-
nally, it offers concrete proposals for how to apply these social scientific tools
and insights to three areas of the National Labor Relation Board’s adjudica-
tion and regulatory authority: the determination of “employer”/”employee”
status, the determination of employees’ substantive rights under section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and the determination of what
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Workers’ collective power against increasingly dominant employers has
disintegrated. With union density at an abysmal 6.2 percent in the private
sector—a level unequaled since the Great Depression1—the vast majority of
workers depend only on individual negotiations with employers to lift stag-
nant wages and ensure upward economic mobility.2 But decentralized, indi-
vidual bargaining is not enough. Economists and legal scholars increasingly
agree that, absent regulation, labor markets naturally strengthen employers’
bargaining power over workers.3
The social costs of unequal bargaining power are immense. When em-
ployers have monopsony power, or power to operate as wage setters rather
than wage takers in the employment bargain, they hire fewer workers—
increasing under- and unemployment—and those workers suffer suppressed
pay and benefits as well as worse working conditions.4 Monopsony power
also reduces economic productivity because employers are not competing
over wages to lure workers into jobs that are the best match for their produc-
tivity and skills.5 Monopsony has distributional effects as well, increasing in-
1. Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 582 (2007) (“Today, private sector union membership is less than ten
percent of private sector employment, . . . roughly where it was in 1930.”).
2. See News Release: Union Members—2019, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https://perma.cc/TDP6-XDQH].
3. See generally ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 147
(2015); ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION: IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN LABOR
MARKETS 29–52 (2003); Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for La-
bor Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 556–60 (2018).
4. See supra note 3. Monopsony power is the flip side of monopoly power—it describes
power over price on the buy side of a transaction, where monopoly power describes power over
price on the sell side of a transaction. The classic definition of monopsony power is the power
to set wages below competitive levels, but labor economists and sociologists also define mo-
nopsony power as power to exact an unequal distribution of the relationship-specific surplus
or to suppress wages below union premium to market rates. For fuller discussion, see infra
notes 295–297 and accompanying text.
5. Naidu et al., supra note 3, at 558–59.
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equality by allowing employers to capture rents from workers’ labor.6 In ad-
dition, when firms hire fewer workers, they produce less output and can
charge higher prices that harm consumers.7
Existing law has failed to step in, leaving employers free to coordinate
and consolidate labor-market power while limiting workers’ ability to do the
same.8 Focused on consumer welfare, antitrust enforcers have allowed em-
ployers to merge without considering the effects of increased labor-market
concentration on workers’ wages.9 And lax enforcement has enabled em-
ployers to engage in a range of conduct that suppresses worker pay, such as
reaching wage-fixing and “no-poach” agreements with other employers and
imposing restrictive noncompete provisions in employment contracts.10 Un-
surprisingly, in the absence of collective, or “countervailing,” power against
employers, workers enter individualized bargaining at a significant disad-
vantage.11 And the empirical consensus is in: income inequality has spiked as
6. See supra note 3.
7. See generally Hiba Hafiz, Labor Antitrust’s Paradox, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 391–92
(2019) (describing circumstances where employer monopsony benefits and harms consumers).
8. See, e.g., Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L.
REV. 378 (2020); Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2 (2016); Cynthia L. Estlund,
The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002).
9. See Hafiz, supra note 7, at 392–99; Hiba Hafiz, Interagency Merger Review in Labor
Markets, 95 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 37 (2020) [hereinafter Hafiz, Interagency Merger]; Ioana
Marinescu & Eric A. Posner, Why Has Antitrust Law Failed Workers?, 105 CORNELL L. REV.
1343 (2020); Ioana Marinescu & Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor Mar-
kets, 94 IND. L.J. 1031, 1032, 1043 (2019); Suresh Naidu & Eric A. Posner, Labor Monopsony
and the Limits of the Law, SSRN (Jan. 13, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3365374
[https://perma.cc/3GZL-5ZJ5]; Naidu et al., supra note 3, at 547. On labor-market concentra-
tion, see generally TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS (2018); Yue Qiu & Aaron Sojourner, La-
bor-Market Concentration and Labor Compensation (IZA Inst. of Lab. Econ., IZA DP No.
12089, 2019), http://ftp.iza.org/dp12089.pdf [https://perma.cc/TAP8-RMB8]; Arindrajit Dube,
Jeff Jacobs, Suresh Naidu & Siddharth Suri, Monopsony in Online Labor Markets, 2 AER:
INSIGHTS 33 (2020); Brad Hershbein, Claudia Macaluso & Chen Yeh, Concentration in U.S.
Local Labor Markets: Evidence from Vacancy and Employment Data (Soc’y for Econ. Dynam-
ics, Meeting Paper No. 1136, 2019), https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2019
/paper_1336.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV9E-LHW7]; José Azar, Ioana Marinescu, Marshall Stein-
baum & Bledi Taska, Concentration in U.S. Labor Markets: Evidence from Online Vacancy Data
(IZA Inst. of Lab. Econ., IZA DP No. 11379, 2018), http://ftp.iza.org/dp11379.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5SQZ-G4ZT].
10. See, e.g., EVAN STARR, ECON. INNOVATION GRP., THE USE, ABUSE, AND
ENFORCEABILITY OF NON-COMPETE AND NO-POACH AGREEMENTS 14 (2019), https://eig.org
/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Non-Competes-2.20.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H4A-EFNE];
Alan B. Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Fran-
chise Sector 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24831, 2018),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24831.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8HU-SSNV]; Eric A. Posner, The
Antitrust Challenge to Covenants Not to Compete in Employment Contracts, SSRN (Sept. 13,
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3453433 [https://perma.cc/G3XG-
8SGW].
11. See Efraim Benmelech, Nittai Bergman & Hyunseob Kim, Strong Employers and
Weak Employees: How Does Employer Concentration Affect Wages? 23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 24307, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers
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workers have suffered economy-wide wage stagnation and a declining share
of the national income for decades.12
When passed in 1935, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act)
was designed to overcome this disparity by lifting workers’ leverage as
against their employers. The Act established labor rights as collective rights
to ensure “equal[] . . . bargaining power between employers and employ-
ees.”13 It created a national labor enforcement agency—the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or Board)—to secure this balance.14 And its first
members set out to establish a Division of Economic Research (DER) to en-
sure institutional alignment between this foundational purpose and the
Board’s real-world enforcement.15 The DER furnished the Board with robust
social scientific analyses to help the Board target its enforcement to ensure
that workers’ bargaining strength matched that of employers.16
But employer lobbying and formalist interpretations of the NLRA have
driven labor law from its original purpose. In its Taft-Hartley and Landrum-
Griffin Amendments to the Act, among other things, Congress exempted
independent contractors from its jurisdiction and reduced workers’ strike
/w24307/w24307.pdf [https://perma.cc/H32D-U3K2] (showing weaker negative correlation
between labor-market concentration and wages in unionized industries); Henry S. Farber,
Daniel Herbst, Ilyana Kuziemko & Suresh Naidu, Unions and Inequality over the Twentieth
Century 33–34 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24587, 2018),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w24587/w24587.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7DR7-P4N3] (showing unions’ equalizing income-distribution effect).
12. On the rise in income inequality, see THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014); ESTELLE SOMMEILLER, MARK PRICE &
ELLIS WAZETER, ECON. POL’Y INST., INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. BY STATE,
METROPOLITAN AREA, AND COUNTY (2016), https://files.epi.org/pdf/107100.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7T2B-DBBG]; Raj Chetty, David Grusky, Maximilian Hell, Nathaniel Hen-
dren, Robert Manduca & Jimmy Narang, The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute In-
come Mobility Since 1940, 356 SCIENCE 398 (2017). On wage stagnation and decline in workers’
bargaining power, see, for example, Josh Bivens, Lawrence Mishel & John Schmitt, ECON.
POL’Y INST., IT’S NOT JUST MONOPOLY AND MONOPSONY: HOW MARKET POWER HAS
AFFECTED AMERICAN WAGES (2018), https://files.epi.org/pdf/145564.pdf [https://perma.cc
/3M5G-SAR6], and LAWRENCE MISHEL, ELISE GOULD & JOSH BIVENS, ECON. POL’Y INST.,
WAGE STAGNATION IN NINE CHARTS (2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2013/wage-stagnation-
in-nine-charts.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMR5-GPZ6]. On decline in labor’s share of income, see,
for example, Nonfarm Business Sector: Labor Share, FRED (June 4, 2020),
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PRS85006173 [https://perma.cc/AY6U-DE3Q?type=image],
and David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson & John Van Reenen,
Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share, 105 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 180
(2017).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1953).
15. See Hiba Hafiz, Economic Analysis of Labor Regulation, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1115,
1119–25.
16. See infra Section I.A; James A. Gross, Economics, Politics, and the Law: The NLRB’s
Division of Economic Research, 1935-1940, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 321, 326 (1970).
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protections.17 Even more, labor law doctrine restrained workers’ rights to
isolated pockets of enterprise bargaining, or bargaining restricted to a single,
narrowly defined employer, and limited protections for workers’ exercise of
economic pressure against employer buyer power.18 This is particularly true
in “fissured” workplaces, where the rise of franchising, outsourcing, subcon-
tracting, and vertical disintegration has increasingly fragmented workplace
structures, in part as a means of stripping upstream employers of compliance
obligations under labor and employment law.19 So while employers retain
rights to integrate, disintegrate, consolidate, or tacitly coordinate their power
to their advantage under corporate, antitrust, contract, and property law,20
workers’ collective rights have eroded to the point where they lack any sub-
stantive ability to function as counterstructure—as effective countervailing
power against employers. A legislative ban on Board hiring of economists
cemented this collapse and relegated the Board to outlier status among fed-
eral agencies.21 Lacking a social scientist-staffed internal division, the Board
was handicapped in its ability to tailor regulation to the policy goals of its or-
ganic statute.22 This lack of social scientific expertise has deprived the Board
and the courts of the benefits of empirical analysis in evaluating how their
decisions contribute to reducing workers’ bargaining power.23
17. See, e.g., JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 248–59 (1981); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983). While some interpret the Taft-
Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Amendments as altering or even phasing out the NLRA’s equal
bargaining power purpose, this Article argues that the NLRA’s equal bargaining power pur-
pose persists due to (1) the Amendments’ retention of the equal bargaining power purpose
language in the Act’s Preamble; (2) the Amendments’ stated purpose of eliminating and pre-
venting employer practices that diminish employment and wages, which accords with prevent-
ing employer monopsony and ensuring equal bargaining power; (3) the Amendments’ legisla-
legislative history; and (4) in pari materia principles requiring construal of the NLRA as an
integrated scheme structuring labor markets in tandem with the antitrust laws’ labor exemp-
tion because of their coevolution, the NLRA’s verbatim adoption of the antitrust statutes’ la-
bor-exemption language, and the survival of those antitrust statutes through the NLRA’s
Amendments. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); Estlund, supra note 8.
19. See DAVIDWEIL, THE FISSUREDWORKPLACE (2014).
20. See, e.g., Sanjukta Paul, Fissuring and the Firm Exemption, 82 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 65, 65 (2019).
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 154(a).
22. See Hafiz, supra note 15. A nonexhaustive list of internal agency divisions housing
social scientific experts include the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics; the De-
partment of Justice’s Antitrust Division’s Economic Analysis Group; the Federal Trade Com-
mission’s Bureau of Economics; the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Office of
Research and Academic Research Council; and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Di-
vision of Economic and Risk Assessment. Id. at 1140–51.
23. Id.; Charlotte Garden, Toward Politically Stable NLRB Lawmaking: Rulemaking vs.
Adjudication, 64 EMORY L.J. 1467, 1475 n.23 (2015); Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud,
The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Sugges-
tions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2044–53 (2009).
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The NLRB’s recent adjudication of the lawfulness of the McDonald’s an-
tiunion campaign is illustrative of this failure. McDonald’s franchisees alleg-
edly fired Sean Caldwell, Tracee Nash, and Quanisha Dupree and
temporarily suspended and reduced work hours of others in retaliation for
their participation in the Fight for $15 campaign, a national campaign led by
unions, worker centers, and labor advocates to lift the minimum wage to $15
an hour.24 In all, the NLRB’s General Counsel (“GC”) charged McDonald’s
franchisees with seventy-eight unfair labor practice (“ULP”) violations for
interfering with and retaliating against workers for their participation.25 But
the GC did not stop there. He charged McDonald’s USA—the franchisees’
franchisor—as a “joint employer” for coordinating and controlling fran-
chisees’ responses to the campaign.26 Adjudication of these charges launched
the longest trial in NLRB history.27 The trial produced a voluminous record,
blasting open McDonald’s USA’s highly guarded but deep involvement in its
franchisees’ anti-union fight.28 It was the Board’s most profound examina-
tion yet of employment relationships in the “fissured workplace.”29 As signif-
icant as the “veritable deluge of evidence” at trial was, the GC’s three-year
effort foundered.30 McDonald’s USA strategically delayed proceedings until
the Trump Administration’s GC was confirmed, and he quickly settled days
before the trial’s close.31 But despite the trial’s impressive dive into the extent
of McDonald’s control over its franchisees’ employees, the Board and its GC
did not deploy the NLRA’s most potent metric for empirically ascertaining
control: the franchisor’s unequal bargaining power over its franchisees’ em-
ployees.32 Thus, by not anchoring its analysis of the NLRA’s provisions—
here, the statutory definition of “employer”—in the Act’s equal bargaining
power purpose, the Board failed to consider significant evidence that could
reveal the franchisor’s wage-setting ability over its franchisees’ employees.
24. McDonald’s USA, LLC, Case No. 02-CA-093893, slip op. at 14 (N.L.R.B. Div. of
Judges July 17, 2018) (denying motions to approve settlement agreements); About Us, FIGHT
FOR $15, https://fightfor15.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/D2GJ-L9F9].
25. NLRB Office of the General Counsel Issues Consolidated Complaints Against McDon-
ald’s Franchisees and their Franchisor McDonald’s, USA, LLC as Joint Employers, NAT’L LAB.
REL. BD. (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-office-of-the-
general-counsel-issues-consolidated-complaints-against [https://perma.cc/4WN8-BBNP].
26. Id.
27. McDonald’s, slip op. at 37.
28. Id. at 8, 33–36.
29. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
30. McDonald’s, slip op. at 27–31, 33–37.
31. See id. at 11, 37; Sharon Block & Benjamin Sachs, The Trump Administration Is
Abandoning McDonald’s Workers – And Everyone Else, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/02/09/the-trump-administra
tion-is-abandoning-mcdonalds-workers-and-everyone-else/ (on file with the Michigan Law
Review). The NLRB has since directed the ALJ to approve the settlement agreements. McDon-
ald’s USA, LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. 134 (2019).
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 151.
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There were key indications of McDonald’s USA’s superior bargaining
position over its franchisees’ employees that antitrust scholars and social sci-
entists would find dispositive of its wage-setting power but that were not
considered at trial. Most importantly, the Board never considered McDon-
ald’s USA’s uniform use of no-poaching provisions and other vertical re-
straints in its franchising agreements that secure its control of franchisee
labor costs.33 Legal scholars, social scientists, and the antitrust agencies all
recognize that no-poaching agreements function as restraints that limit la-
bor-market competition and reduce workers’ wages.34 Being able to move
from job to job and seek offers from other employers “is critical for earnings
growth,” so restraints that prevent mobility deny workers “the benefits of
within-industry competition for their skills.”35 Workers who sign noncom-
petes in their employment contracts earn less than equivalent workers who
do not, and workers subject to no-poaching agreements are even worse off
because they are often unaware that those agreements exist.36 Workers are
not parties to such employer-to-employer agreements, and employers agree
to them in secret because they can violate the antitrust laws.37 No-poaching
agreements benefit franchisors and franchisees by allowing them to suppress
labor costs while hiding conduct that could trigger litigation and organizing
campaigns across individual franchisees.38 But franchisor restraints in fran-
chisee labor markets are not limited to no-poaching provisions. Social scien-
tific research has revealed how a range of vertical restraints in franchising
agreements solidify franchisors’ control of franchisees’ labor costs.39 Togeth-
er, these social scientific models and empirical data reveal significant fran-
chisor power over franchisee employees’ wages and working conditions.
Because the Board failed to prioritize the Act’s equal bargaining power
purpose when assessing McDonald’s USA’s “joint employer” status, it
missed a key opportunity to secure franchisee employees’ countervailing
33. See Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL 3105955, at *2
(N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE
FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS 4 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511
/download [https://perma.cc/24FK-YBQG]; No-Poach Approach: Division Update Spring 2019,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 30, 2019), http://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-
update-spring-2019/no-poach-approach [https://perma.cc/7JZ8-ZRCG]; see also Kati L. Grif-
fith, An Empirical Study of Fast-Food Franchising Contracts: Towards a New “Intermediary”
Theory of Joint Employment, 94 WASH. L. REV. 171, 198–200 (2019); Brian Callaci, The Histor-
ical and Legal Creation of a Fissured Workplace: The Case of Franchising (Sept. 2019) (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst), https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi
/viewcontent.cgi?article=2719&context=dissertations_2 [https://perma.cc/KDV3-PLDF];
STARR, supra note 10.
34. STARR, supra note 10, at 10; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note
33; Griffith, supra note 33.
35. STARR, supra note 10, at 10.
36. Id.; see also Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *3.
37. STARR, supra note 10, at 4.
38. See, e.g., Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955.
39. See Callaci, supra note 33.
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power in negotiating their wages and working conditions. Where a franchi-
sor controls the purse strings but has no duties to collectively bargain with
workers as a “joint employer,” workers may only lawfully exert economic
pressure through striking an intermediary actor—their franchisee employ-
er—that has little power to improve their wages or terms and conditions of
work. Thus, failing to find joint employer status has cascading effects on
workers’ ability to remedy the power imbalance through collective action.
There can be no conceivable equal bargaining power between franchisee
employees and a franchisor that retains power over their wages but lacks any
duty to bargain over them and, even worse, may affirmatively enjoin and
seek monetary penalties from such employees for trying to compel better
wage terms or employment conditions.
The government’s failure to successfully regulate employer buyer power
over workers has invited a number of proposed reforms to both labor and
antitrust law. First, labor law scholars and advocates have proposed amend-
ing the NLRA to strengthen its organizing and strike protections and extend
universal bargaining coverage to all workers through sectoral bargaining, or
sector-wide collective bargaining where workers and employers negotiate
employment terms that cover both unionized and nonunionized workers
within that sector.40 Others propose jettisoning the NLRA’s framework alto-
gether in favor of a new statute or broader social-safety-net protections that
liberate workers from depending on employers for healthcare and other ben-
efits.41
While these proposals are rich and fruitful, they face significant chal-
lenges. The first is political: congressional inability or unwillingness to
amend current labor law is well documented.42 And other Democratic agen-
da items—healthcare, immigration, and climate-change reforms—will likely
take priority over labor law reform, exhausting limited political capital
40. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, Union Rights for All: Toward Sectoral Bargaining in the Unit-
ed States, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 56 (Richard Bales & Charlotte Garden eds., 2019); SHARON BLOCK & BENJAMIN
SACHS, CLEAN SLATE FOR WORKER POWER: BUILDING A JUST ECONOMY AND DEMOCRACY 3,
37–45, https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/files/lwp/files/full_report_clean_slate_for_worker_power
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2J44-D5LR]; David Madland, How to Promote Sectoral Bargaining in the
United States, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND (July 10, 2019, 12:01 AM),
https://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/economy/report/2019/07/10/174385/promote
-sectoral-bargaining-united-states [https://perma.cc/BGQ3-V2YP]; KATE ANDRIAS & BRISHEN
ROGERS, ROOSEVELT INST., REBUILDING WORKER VOICE IN TODAY’S ECONOMY 26–33 (2018),
https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI-Rebuilding-Worker-Voice-
201808.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T7T-VXNK]; Andrias, supra note 8.
41. Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and Employment
Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254 (2018); Brishen Rogers, Basic Income in a Just Society, BOS. REV. (May
15, 2017), http://bostonreview.net/forum/brishen-rogers-basic-income-just-society [https://
perma.cc/UY9H-MG4P].
42. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE NEW GILDED AGE 233–68 (2d ed. 2016); AMERICAN GRIDLOCK: THE SOURCES,
CHARACTER, AND IMPACT OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION (James A. Thurber & Antoine
Yoshinaka eds., 2015); Andrias, supra note 8, at 32–37.
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Democrats can expend if elected.43 Second, sectoral bargaining and an-
tipoverty programs are only as effective as the governmental and labor-
market institutions that enforce them.44 Those institutions consist most im-
portantly of unions and other worker-led organizations, whose strength
turns on the protections and remedies substantive labor law affords them.45
Thus, while empirical evidence suggests that broad collective bargaining
coverage strengthens worker bargaining power and reduces wage inequality
in other countries, those results are highly correlated with much higher un-
ion-density rates, stronger labor-market institutions, and robust labor law
protections.46 In other words, without institutions and protections ensuring
workers’ equal bargaining power with employers, sectoral bargaining may
not strengthen and may even weaken unionization rates.47 Indeed, the histo-
ry of sectoral bargaining in the United States without strong unions—under
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) labor boards and current state-
level wage boards—is characterized by weak enforcement and political over-
rides of high wage demands.48 That history also instructs that, without equal-
43. The Affordable Care Act’s impact on exhausting the Obama Administration’s politi-
cal capital at the expense of other priorities is illustrative. See, e.g., Mike DeBonis, The Political
Price of Obamacare, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics
/national/obama-legacy/obamacare.html [https://perma.cc/VEZ4-WMK3].
44. See Catherine L. Fisk, Sustainable Alt-Labor, 95 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 7 (2020).
45. See, e.g., Andrew Bossie, Labor and Institutions in the Wake of the World Wars,
ANDREW BOSSIE 1–2 (Oct. 25, 2009), http://andrewbossie.com/working%20papers/Labor_Inst
_World_Wars.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DSW-XMVQ]; Suresh Naidu & Noam Yuchtman, Labor
Market Institutions in the Gilded Age of American Economic History (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 22117, 2016), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22117.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6LQG-N8BT].
46. See, e.g., MAARTEN VAN KLAVEREN & DENIS GREGORY, RESTORING MULTI-
EMPLOYER BARGAINING IN EUROPE: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES (2019); ORG. ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., GOOD JOBS FOR ALL IN A CHANGING WORLD OF WORK (2018); SHANE
GODFREY, INT’L LAB. OFF., MULTI-EMPLOYER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SOUTH AFRICA
(2018); What’s Happening to Collective Bargaining in Europe?, EUR. TRADE UNION INST. (Apr.
11, 2019), https://www.etui.org/services/facts-figures/benchmarks/what-s-happening-to-
collective-bargaining-in-europe [https://perma.cc/2XDX-M4HS]; Maarten Keune, Less Gov-
ernance Capacity and More Inequality: The Effects of the Assault on Collective Bargaining in the
EU, in WAGE BARGAINING UNDER THE NEW EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE:
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH 283 (Guy Van Gyes & Thorsten Schulten
eds., 2015); Damian Grimshaw, Gerhard Bosch & Jill Rubery, Minimum Wages and Collective
Bargaining: What Types of Pay Bargaining Can Foster Positive Pay Equity Outcomes?, 52 BRIT.
J. INDUS. RELS. 470 (2014).
47. See, e.g., César F. Rosado Marzán, Can Wage Boards Revive U.S. Labor?: Marshalling
Evidence from Puerto Rico, 95 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127, 134–35 (2020); Lyle Scruggs, The Ghent
System and Union Membership in Europe, 1970–1996, 55 POL. RSCH. Q. 275, 286–90 (2002).
48. See generally ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY:
A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 166–68 (Fordham Univ. Press 1995) (1966); LEWIS L.
LORWIN & ARTHUR WUBNIG, LABOR RELATIONS BOARDS: THE REGULATION OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING UNDER THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT (1935); Kate Andrias, Social
Bargaining in States and Cities: Toward a More Egalitarian and Democratic Workplace Law, 12
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 6–10 (2017); Harold L. Cole & Lee E. Ohanian, New Deal
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izing bargaining power, sectoral bargaining can facilitate employer collusion
in labor and product markets at the expense of workers and consumers.49 So
labor law’s ability to regulate workers’ relative bargaining power is and will
continue to be a necessary component of any successful labor-market regula-
tion scheme.
A second strand of scholarship has sought to tackle employer power and
its resulting wage suppression through the antitrust laws. This recent body of
antitrust scholarship has been motivated in part by the failure of existing la-
bor law reform efforts.50 But, as I have addressed elsewhere, workers face
significant obstacles to success under existing antitrust doctrine, which gen-
erally prioritizes consumer welfare over that of other constituencies, like
workers.51 And the singular focus of antitrust enforcers on traditional micro-
economic analysis provides limited insight into the complicated bargaining
dynamics that determine compensation in labor markets.52 As a result, anti-
trust scholars readily concede that labor law reform is a necessary comple-
ment to antitrust enforcement in correcting for employers’ monopsony
power and anticompetitive conduct in labor markets.53
This Article builds on and responds to current proposals by arguing for
a “structural” approach to labor law itself. By “structural” approach, I mean
one that takes into account workers’ relative bargaining power as compared
to their employers in determining the scope of substantive labor rights and
Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 112 J. POL.
ECON. 779 (2004).
49. SeeHAWLEY, supra note 48, at 166–68.
50. See supra note 9; Ioana Marinescu & Eric A. Posner, A Proposal to Enhance Antitrust
Protection Against Labor Monopsony (Roosevelt Inst. Working Paper, 2018),
https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI_ProposalToEnhanceAntitrust
Protection_workingpaper_201812.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G8F-77K9].
51. Hafiz, supra note 7, at 383.
52. See infra Section II.F.
53. Naidu & Posner, supra note 9, at 2 (“[A]ntitrust regulation is a poor substitute for
traditional employment/labor law, . . . more extensive labor market intervention is required to
combat the natural monopsonies in labor market[s].”); see also Marinescu & Posner, supra
note 9, at 1389–91 (advocating supplementing antitrust with labor law findings); Marinescu &
Posner, supra note 50, at 13–16, 21 (same). A third set of scholars address market failures and
unequal gains from trade through law and economics, microeconomic theory, game theory,
and behavioral science solutions. See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,WEALTH, ANDHAPPINESS (Pen-
guin Books 2009) (2008); Albert Choi & George Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on
Contract Design, 98 VA. L. REV. 1665 (2012); Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, 63
STAN. L. REV. 869 (2011) [hereinafter Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts]; Omri Ben-Shahar,
Essay, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 396 (2009) [hereinafter
Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules]. While they integrate and advance
the literature in many areas—particularly contract and consumer protection law—they have
not concentrated on remedying the employment bargain or collective bargaining. But see
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Eco-
nomics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1502–04 (1998).
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in resolving disputes. A key component of such an approach involves the in-
tegration of social scientific advances in the study of market power and bar-
gaining power into the NLRA’s administration.54 Because employers’ current
buyer power strengthens their ability to indefinitely hold out on worker de-
mands in the employment bargain, the “structural” approach seeks to resitu-
ate workers to a bargaining position from which they could equally hold out.
And it proposes accomplishing that by applying social scientific tools to a
reinvigorated analysis of the NLRA’s core regulatory components: who
counts as “employees” and “employers”; the scope of workers’ right to or-
ganize, form unions, bargain collectively, and engage in concerted activity;
and the scope of workers’ and employers’ ULPs.55
This proposal does not require overcoming stubborn congressional im-
passes because it is already baked into the purpose of the labor law. The
NLRA’s legislative history and policy goals support achieving equal bargain-
ing power, as does the Board’s early practice of institutionally aligning re-
search and litigation support with its DER. Reviving attention to this
purpose is consistent with the Board and the courts’ long-adopted purposiv-
ist approach to the NLRA.56 In the face of unprecedented income inequality,
54. See infra Sections II.A–E.
55. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2)–(3), 157–158; see also infra Section III.
56. See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984) (“[W]hat emerges
from the general background of § 7—and what is consistent with the Act’s statement of pur-
pose—is a congressional intent to create an equality in bargaining power between the employ-
ee and the employer.”); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 123–24 (1944) (“Whether,
given the intended national uniformity, the term ‘employee’ includes such workers as
these . . . must be answered primarily from the history, terms and purposes of the legislation.”);
Amy Semet, An Empirical Examination of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 103 MINN. L. REV.
2255, 2291 (2019) (finding the “Board uses purposive methods, at least in part, in almost all” of
over seven thousand dataset decisions from Clinton through Obama Boards); Fisk & Malam-
ud, supra note 23, at 2040 (“The Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation in NLRA cases often
turns on nothing more than . . . the underlying purposes of the statute.”); Daniel P. O’Gorman,
Construing the National Labor Relations Act: The NLRB and Methods of Statutory Construc-
tion, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 177, 217–20 (2008); see also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536
(1992) (“[W]e have long recognized[] that the Board has the ‘special function of applying the
general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.’ ” (quoting NLRB v. Erie Re-
sistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963))); GUY DAVIDOV, A PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO LABOUR
LAW (2016). While the NLRA has multiple purposes, Parts I and III argue that Congress
viewed equal bargaining power as necessary for achieving the NLRA’s other purposes, and so-
cial scientific developments support that view. The purposivist reading as proposed here is also
consistent with other approaches to statutory interpretation. First, it is consistent with a textu-
alist reading: the equal bargaining power purpose is clearly stated in the text of the Preamble,
and the statutory text of the NLRA’s various provisions discussed herein (sections 2, 7, and 8)
are interpreted in the context of the whole statute under a textualist approach. See, e.g., Caleb
Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347–48, 376, 348 n.5, 376 n.88 (2005). Further, a
purposivist reading is consistent with an intentionalist/statutory originalist approach to inter-
preting the NLRA. The legislative history of both the 1935 NLRA and the Taft-Hartley and
Landrum-Griffin Amendments reveal Congress’s intent that the NLRA equalize bargaining
power between employers and employees. See infra Section I.A and note 159; see also Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 30, Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No. 17-1618)
(questioning counsel about whether the 1964 Congress, in prohibiting discrimination on the
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ensuring workers’ countervailing power to pervasive employer power is a
crucial policy goal, now more than ever. As employers continue to devise
new mechanisms to evade legal obligations under labor law, including
through workplace restructuring and outsourcing to the “gig” economy, a
structural analysis would ensure that legal determinations under the labor
law are tethered to labor-market realities that limit workers’ leverage over
their terms and conditions of work. And ensuring equal bargaining power
could complement broader legislative reform efforts if and when Congress
moves forward on them.
Nonlabor agencies such as the antitrust agencies and the Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau (CFPB) already utilize analyses of market and
bargaining power based on contributions from a range of social scientific
fields.57 Repealing the ban on Board hiring of economists and/or utilizing
agency regulatory tools like notice-and-comment rulemaking, solicitation of
amicus briefs, and coordination with other agencies could allow the Board to
follow their lead and modernize Board regulation of collective rights.58 Inte-
grating social science into the Board’s analysis of and justifications for its
regulation would better substantiate its factual findings and interpretive de-
cisions for judicial review.59 And it would open new, evidence-based lines of
contestation about the sources and adequacy of the Board’s rationales.
In advocating for a structural approach to labor-rights regulation, this
Article makes three key contributions. First, it documents the dispersion and
misalignment of workers’ collective rights under current labor law. Part I re-
veals the early institutional alignment between Board enforcement and its
social scientific expertise through the NLRA’s equal bargaining power pur-
pose. It then documents the historical narrowing of workers’ collective rights
to limited tactics by a small set of workers against highly protected individual
enterprises and the concomitant rise of employer power over workers’ wages
and working conditions. This narrowing occurred through three mecha-
nisms: (1) tightening the labor exemption to the antitrust laws, (2) shrinking
bargaining units and expanding exemptions to the labor law’s protections,
and (3) circumscribing workers’ NLRA-protected rights while construing
ULP violations in favor of employers over employees. This Article demon-
basis of “sex,” intended to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); Katie R.
Eyer, Statutory Originalism and LGBT Rights, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 63, 87–88 (2019)
(providing a brief account of the rise of “original public meaning” statutory originalism as a
method of statutory interpretation).
57. SeeHafiz, supra note 15, at 1140–54.
58. A repeal of the NLRA’s economist-hiring ban was passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives as part of the Protecting the Right to Organize (“PRO”) Act on February 6, 2020.
H.R. 2472, 116th Cong. § 2(c) (2020) (enacted). This is inspired by similar institutional-design-
based approaches to balancing power in the administrative state. See generally K. SABEEL
RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION (2016); K. Sabeel Rahman, Reconstructing the
Administrative State in an Era of Economic and Democratic Crisis, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1671
(2018) (book review); Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness
in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049 (2016).
59. See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
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strates that this narrowing has strengthened employers’ bargaining power
relative to workers, and thus frustrated the NLRA’s key equal bargaining
power purpose. In Part II, this Article advances equal bargaining power the-
ory by deriving four schematic categories of bargaining power from social
scientific developments in economics, industrial relations, and the sociology
and psychology of work: “external,” “transactional,” “internal,” and “distri-
butional.” It summarizes the social scientific research contributing to these
four mechanisms of assessing bargaining power and how they can be used by
the Board and the courts to better ensure equal bargaining power. And final-
ly, Part III offers concrete proposals for how to apply those social scientific
tools to three areas of the Board’s adjudication and regulatory authority: the
determination of “employer”/“employee” status, the determination of em-
ployees’ substantive rights under the NLRA’s section 7, and the determina-
tion of what counts as sanctionable ULPs under the NLRA’s section 8.
I. DISPERSION ANDMISALIGNMENT OFWORKERS’ COLLECTIVE RIGHTS
Modern labor-market regulation emerged from a congressional recogni-
tion that, to enable workers to lift their wages and secure a more equal share
of their contributions to economic growth, it would need to restrain firms’
ability to consolidate economic power under the antitrust laws while ex-
empting and protecting workers’ collective coordination under the Act.
Thus, antitrust and labor law were an integrated scheme that coevolved un-
der the supervision of regulators and social scientists who viewed economic
stabilization—through economic panics, recessions, the Great Depression,
and rampant strikes—as hinging crucially on calibrating the equal bargain-
ing power of labor and capital. This Part details these integrated origins and
the political and doctrinal forces that dismantled Congress’s unitary vision of
labor-market regulation after the Second World War. It delineates the
mechanisms by which the Board, the courts, and the postwar Congress shift-
ed from a centralized system of labor-market regulation directed at restrain-
ing employers’ economic power to a decentralized system curbing and
dispersing workers’ collective economic power.
A. Equal Bargaining Power: The Origins of Modern Labor Regulation
The NLRA’s equal bargaining power purpose is at the core of workers’
substantive collective rights under the statute. Those rights are enshrined in
the NLRA’s section 7: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection . . . .”60 By far the most potent collective protection under the Act
is that for workers’ “concerted activities,” or protected ability to engage in
60. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
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strikes and other economic weapons collectively.61 Section 7’s language was
extracted verbatim from prior statutes immunizing workers’ coordination
from antitrust liability and injunctions under the Sherman Antitrust Act as a
means of ensuring equal bargaining power. This Subpart reveals how anti-
trust law and social science shaped the NLRA’s design and implementation
as a means of overcoming employer wage setting and achieving macroeco-
nomic growth and redistributive goals. It historically situates the NLRA’s
equal bargaining power purpose to better understand why analysis of eco-
nomic power and social scientific expertise were so central to the NLRA’s
original achievements that would later be dismantled.
Until the Clayton Act of 1914, federal courts applied the Sherman Act
against labor activity more often than business activity.62 A product of mas-
sive labor organizing, the Clayton Act exempted worker coordination from
the antitrust laws, declaring that “labor . . . is not a commodity or article of
commerce” and labor unions were not “illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.”63 It prohibited courts from
enjoining strikes, boycotts, and other lawful concerted activities as long as
they arose out of employer-employee disputes over employment terms.64
The Supreme Court recognized the labor exemption’s congressional purpose
as equalizing worker bargaining power with employers’ industry-wide:
Union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with
their employer. . . . To render this combination at all effective, employees
must make their combination extend beyond one shop. . . . [B]ecause in the
competition between employers they are bound to be affected by the stand-
ard of wages of their trade in the neighborhood.65
But a conservative judiciary interpreted the Clayton Act narrowly,
granting injunctive relief to employers against strikes pending resolution of
their legal challenges to workers’ coordinated conduct.66 Courts’ imposition
of strike-killing injunctions propelled union advocacy for broader immunity
from antitrust liability and the ultimate 1932 passage of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.67 The Act barred federal courts from enjoining workers’
61. See, e.g., Alex Gourevitch, The Right to Strike: A Radical View, 112 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 905, 905 (2018); Ahmed White, Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Ef-
fective Right to Strike, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 1065 (2018).
62. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731–32 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53); WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST
PENALTY REFORM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 52 (1986); ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 2–3 (1976). See generally FELIX
FRANKFURTER &NATHANGREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
63. Clayton Act § 6 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17).
64. Id. § 20 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 52).
65. Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921)
(emphasis added).
66. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
67. Eileen Silverstein, Collective Action, Property Rights and Law Reform: The Story of
the Labor Injunction, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 97, 107–08 (1993).
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nonviolent labor disputes.68 It recognized that individual workers’ unequal
bargaining power relative to employers—who could legally engage in collec-
tive forms of ownership—necessitated the ban. The Act also recognized the
need for worker protection against “interference, restraint, or coercion of
employers . . . in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”69
The Norris-La Guardia Act’s labor exemption from antitrust law was the
product of a policy consensus recognizing individual workers’ unequal bar-
gaining power against firms and consolidated industries. Its language was
crafted by leading attorneys and an economist who together would compose
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s brain trust—Felix Frankfurter, Francis Sayre,
Herman Oliphant, Edwin Witte, and Donald Richberg.70 They distilled a
broader Progressive understanding—from Legal Realists to institutional
economists and beyond—that employers’ unequal bargaining power
stemmed from state-granted privileges and rights under corporate and prop-
erty law. This unequal power precluded any ideal of formal equality achieva-
ble through individual employment contracts: “The premise of legal equality
was in fact fallacious, for legal rights, privileges and duties depend on prop-
erty rights and these depend on the law. . . . [which] still imposes vastly une-
qual handicaps.”71 In presenting the bill, Senator George Norris emphasized
individual workers’ helplessness relative to “the combination of large corpo-
rations in a particular line of business.”72 Such combinations of employer
power, he argued, required “the laboring man . . . [to] accept unconditionally
the terms [employers] laid down,” and “[i]f conditions become unbeara-
ble, . . . to go alone and face the big combination of perhaps millions of
wealth. . . . He has no opportunity to join with his fellows and make his de-
mands effective.”73
This consensus was even more pronounced in the passage and imple-
mentation of the NIRA, which adopted—again verbatim—the collective-
rights protections exempted from antitrust scrutiny in the Norris-La Guar-
dia Act. The NIRA suspended the antitrust laws to allow industries to form
trade associations and adopt codes of fair competition that would regulate
production and pricing, including industry-wide standards for wages and
working conditions.74 Approval of industry committees’ codes was condi-
68. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 101–115).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (emphasis added).
70. Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of
“Concert” Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286, 332–35 (1981) (col-
lecting sources).
71. Robert L. Hale, Labor Law, in 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 667, 667–
68 (Edwin R.A. Seligman et al. eds., 1932).
72. 75 CONG. REC. 4504 (1932).
73. Id.
74. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195, § 1, de-
clared unconstitutional by A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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tioned, under section 7 of the Act, on employees in the industry having “the
right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, . . . free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employ-
ers . . . in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.”75 The NIRA also required employers to comply
with maximum hours, minimum rates of pay, and other working conditions
“approved or prescribed by the President.”76
But the employee-representation plans industries formed to comply
with section 7 were deeply disappointing to organized labor and Senator
Robert Wagner. Wagner used the lessons of the NIRA’s industry-wide labor-
management regulatory scheme to inform his first failed Labor Disputes Act
of 1934 and the final NLRA of 1935. The National Recovery Administra-
tion’s (NRA’s) weaknesses stemmed in no small part from employer groups
colluding and controlling labor decisions through standard setting in their
respective industry codes.77 Immunizing this standard setting from antitrust
liability allowed employers to share information not only about current and
future production quotas and pricing in product markets but also about la-
bor costs and union-busting strategies in labor markets.78 Organized labor’s
interests were left to their limited advisory capacity on a nonbinding Labor
Advisory Board to the NRA, the political process, and strikes.79
In responding to these deficiencies, Wagner sought to reinvigorate the
NRA’s core benefit of restructuring the relationship between labor and capi-
tal, but through adapting section 7 into labor legislation. Wagner appreciated
the NRA’s attempt to establish “a balance between production and profits on
one side and wages on the other[,] . . . promot[ing] healthy price relation-
ships and . . . prevent[ing] any particular group from becoming too favored
in the exchange process.”80 But Wagner saw a key limitation in the NRA: its
inability to achieve distributional fairness that would increase mass-
purchasing power necessary for a sustainable recovery.81 What struck Wag-
ner most was the fact that, despite suspending the antitrust laws and allow-
ing industries to price-fix, and despite the growth in industrial output and
75. Id. § 7(a).
76. Id.
77. See generally 1 JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 7–15 (1974).
78. See generally id.; IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
POLICY 35–37 (1950).
79. See LORWIN&WUBNIG, supra note 48, at 57–59.
80. 78 CONG. REC. 9334 (1934) (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 9335 (“The immediate problem before us . . . is to prevent the production-
control devices of the new deal from being turned into an old-deal instrument for the profit of
the few and the denial of the many. . . . More fundamental than any of the questions . . . is the
relationship between wages and profits. A balance between the return to industry and the re-
turn to labor is at the very core of economic stability, and it is here that the new-deal program
seems in greatest need of immediate improvement.” (emphasis added)).
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profits the NRA effectuated, employers refused to reduce workers’ hours or
raise wages.82 Further, under the NRA, employment rates had only minimal-
ly increased, making “additional and more serious depressions . . . only a
matter of a few years.”83 Wagner, in other words, blamed employer collusion
and ability to profitably suppress wages, advocating for more than merely re-
turning wages to levels allowing industry to run at existing rates. He argued,
“We cannot justify ourselves in stopping short when that level is reached.
We must go on to create a fairer system, in which the worker shall share eq-
uitably in our great wealth . . . .”84 He justified worker combinations under
the Wagner Act as a means of doing so: “To match the huge aggregate[] of
modern capital[,] the wage earner must be organized . . . .”85
Wagner’s labor law was thus first proposed as a NIRA amendment to
administer its section 7 provisions through “a national labor board with ade-
quate enforcement powers.”86 It was anchored in employers’ ability to “unite
in trade associations”—a necessity, Wagner believed, to lift the country out
of depression. But he viewed this “united strength” as “fraught with great
danger to workers and consumers if it is not counterbalanced by the equal
organization and equal bargaining power of employees.”87 Wagner under-
stood that equality as necessary to ensure “a wise distribution of wealth be-
tween management and labor, to maintain a full flow of purchasing power,
and to prevent recurrent depressions. Genuine collective bargaining is the
only way to attain equality of bargaining power.”88
This foundational purpose—achieving equal bargaining power—
animated all other provisions of Wagner’s Act. The Act’s proposed ban on
employer-dominated, or “company,” unions was based on those unions
mak[ing] a sham of equal bargaining power by restricting employee coop-
eration to a single employer unit at a time when business men are allowed
to band together in large groups. It deprives workers of the wider coopera-
tion . . . necessary . . . to stabilize and standardize wage levels . . . and to ex-
ercise their proper voice in economic affairs.89
Wagner believed company unions could not correct information asymme-
tries and other market failures accruing to employer power:
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 9335–36 (emphasis added).
85. Robert Wagner, Senator, The New Responsibilities of Organized Labor, Address at
the New York State Federation of Labor Convention, in 70 CONG. REC. 225, 226 (1928); see
alsoMark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace
Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1409 n.124 (1993) (discussing impact on NLRA of legal
realist analysis of “pervasiveness of relations of power and coercion in the labor market”).
86. 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934).
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
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[A worker] has only slight knowledge of the labor market, or of general busi-
ness conditions. His trade is tending a machine. If forbidden to hire an ex-
pert in industrial relationships, he is entirely ineffectual in his attempts to
take advantage of legitimate opportunities. . . . [O]nly representatives who
are not subservient to the employer . . . can act freely in the interest of em-
ployees.90
Wagner concluded—based on the “preeminent institutionalist economists”
who formed his inner circle91—that employer buyer power, unchecked by
labor-market institutions with real countervailing power, would fail to lift
workers’ wages.92 The bill, as summarized, was introduced as Senate Bill
2926 “to equalize the bargaining power of employers and employees,” and it
was referred in final form by that same language.93
The NLRA formulated workers’ substantive rights in the very language
of workers’ protected coordination rights under the Norris-La Guardia Act
and NIRA’s section 7, retaining as a core purpose equal bargaining power
between employers and employees. In referring the bill, the Senate Report
stated the NLRA’s objectives as industrial peace and encouraging “that
equality of bargaining power which is a prerequisite to equality of opportuni-
ty and freedom of contract.”94 The Senate grounded this second objective on
the consensus that the “relative weakness of the isolated wage earner caught
in the complex of modern industrialism” was “such a commonplace of our
economic literature and political vocabulary that it needs no exposition.”95
This consensus stemmed from an understanding of how market concentra-
tion and weaker government and judicial antitrust enforcement against
firms impacted workers.96 The Committee Report cited a long history of
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. Barenberg, supra note 85, at 1405.
92. 78 CONG. REC. 3439, 3444 (1934) (“The recovery program . . . . made relatively slow
progress in affecting that fair distribution of purchasing power upon which permanent pros-
perity must rest. Today, despite the minimum-wage provisions of the codes, the purchasing
power of the individual employee . . . is less than it was . . . last year. This situation cannot be
remedied by new codes or by general exhortations. It can be remedied only when there is genu-
ine cooperation between employers and employees, on a basis of equal bargaining power.”).
93. Id.; S. REP. NO. 573, at 1 (1935).
94. S. REP. NO. 573, at 3 (emphasis added); Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the
Employment Relation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 579, 617 (2009). The NLRA’s language and legis-
lative history is ambiguous as to whether Congress intended the Board to administer an even
balance of bargaining power or intended the establishment of collective bargaining to itself
place labor and capital on equal footing. See 29 U.S.C. § 151; Klare, supra note 18, at 282 n.56.
In the face of this ambiguity, courts devised doctrine favoring the latter interpretation, excising
from the Board’s analysis and intervention in the unionization and collective bargaining pro-
cess substantive determinations about the realities of equal bargaining power in labor-
management relations and the impact of its regulation on those realities. See infra Section
I.D.1.
95. S. REP. NO. 573, at 3.
96. Id. (“This relative weakness of position has been intensified by the . . . greater con-
centration of business, by the tendency of the courts to narrow the application of the antitrust
Michigan Law Review
Congress’s role “in redressing this inequality of bargaining power” through
the Railway Labor and Norris-LaGuardia Acts as well as Depression-era in-
terventionist labor policies.97 It thus envisioned an enduring policy to equal-
ize bargaining power originating from antitrust exemptions and fulfilled by
the NLRA, unifying antitrust and labor policy under a single goal. Minimum
wage/maximum hour legislation alone was “not a complete solution.”98 The
Committee’s consensus was that “collective bargaining, as it bears upon in-
dustrial peace and equality of bargaining power,” was necessary under a
“permanent Federal law” of national scope.99
To achieve the NLRA’s equal bargaining power goal, the Senate Report
understood statutory “employees” as “not limited to the employees of a par-
ticular employer” or “a single-employer unit.”100 Accustomed to sectoral
bargaining under the NIRA’s industrial boards, the Senate not only wel-
comed industry-wide bargaining but may also have thought it necessary for
the Act’s survival on Commerce Clause grounds after Schechter Poultry de-
clared the NIRA unconstitutional.101 Contemporaneous commentary viewed
restricting collective bargaining to a single employer group as frustrating the
NLRA’s policy of “stabiliz[ing] . . . wage rates throughout each industry,”
“ignor[ing] the realities of an industrial system dominated by huge combines
subject to centralized control.”102 The NLRA’s equal bargaining power pur-
pose was also extended to justify “confining the bill to unfair labor practices
by employers” as opposed to unions as well.103
As passed, the 1935 NLRA’s stated purpose in its Preamble—“restoring
equality of bargaining power between employers and employees”—
structurally reinforced the language it drew verbatim from the language of
the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Act’s exemptions of worker coordination
from antitrust liability.104 This purpose was institutionally aligned with the
Board’s development of expertise in its DER, which researched, analyzed,
laws, and more recently by the policy of the Government in encouraging cooperative activity
among trade and industrial groups.”).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 6.
101. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See S. REP. NO. 573,
at 7 (“[T]he limitation of this bill to events affecting interstate commerce is sufficient to pre-
vent intervention by the Federal Government in controversies of purely local significance.”);
id. (“ ‘[L]abor dispute’ includes cases where the disputants do not stand in the proximate rela-
tion of employer and employee. . . . [C]ourts and Congress have already recognized that em-
ployers and employees not in proximate relationship may be drawn into common
controversies by economic forces.”).
102. Legislation Comment, The Wagner Labor Disputes Act, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 1098,
1107 (1935).
103. S. REP. NO. 573, at 16. The 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments extended the NLRA’s
prohibition against employers’ unfair labor practices to also cover unfair labor practices com-
mitted by unions. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
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and provided litigation support for Board enforcement between 1935 and
1940, when its appropriations were cut.105 During the period that the DER
functioned, it conducted industry- and economy-wide studies that assessed
the sources of employer and employee bargaining power in specific indus-
tries.106 Social scientists in the Division completed impact studies of the ef-
fects of employer coercion on worker organizing; collective bargaining on
labor peace; and, in likely the first agency cost-benefit analysis ever, the
NLRB’s regulation and failure to regulate.107
A good example of the DER’s use of social science to further the NLRA’s
equal bargaining power goals is its 217-page study researching collective
bargaining in the newspaper industry. The study, entitled “Collective Bar-
gaining in the Newspaper Industry,” framed its inquiry in terms of the “leg-
islative finding which led to the [Board’s] creation”: “that the flow of
commerce is affected and burdened by the inequality of bargaining power”
between employers and employees.108 And its research on labor relations in
the newspaper industry was to serve as the “basis upon which conclusions
may be reached on . . . whether there is disparity between the bargaining
power of employers and that of employees.”109 The report advised the Board
on “how to increase and coordinate [union] membership in order to achieve
bargaining power commensurate with that of large scale industry and pub-
lishers’ associations.”110 It described the “integration of manage-
ment . . . characteristic of the industry” as “mean[ing] that the usual inequal-
inequality of bargaining power between the employer and the individual
employee is increased” because
[t]he employee . . . faces not only the management of his paper but the cen-
tralized authority of the entire chain, with the augmented power derived
from[:] its increased political and social influence[;] its pooled re-
sources[;] . . . its capacity to hire the services of able attorneys and labor ex-
perts and to own large facilities for research and propaganda[;]
and its membership in the American Newspaper Publishers’ Association.111
The study reported that industry-wide “[c]entralization and coordination of
bargaining activity and increased membership . . . enabled the Guild to re-
duce the disparity in bargaining power between the local Guilds and the
105. SeeHafiz, supra note 15.
106. See, e.g., DIV. ECON. RSCH., NLRB, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE NEWSPAPER
INDUSTRY (1939).
107. See, e.g., 4 NLRB ANN. REP. 21, 57, 155–56 (1939); DAVID J. SAPOSS & MORRIS
WEISZ, NLRB, DIV. OF ECON. RSCH., RESEARCH MEMORANDUM NO. 7, SAVINGS RESULTING
FROM THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT IN 1938,
COMPAREDWITHCOSTS OF ITS OPERATION (1939).
108. DIV. ECON. RSCH., NLRB, supra note 106, at ix.
109. Id. at x.
110. Id. at 68.
111. Id. at 127, 169 (emphasis added).
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publishers.”112 In other studies, the DER introduced firm-specific and indus-
try-wide evidence to support the Board’s prosecution of ULPs based on em-
ployers’ unequal bargaining power; the scope of appropriate bargaining units
(e.g., whether “the collective bargaining history and the economic character
of an industry warrant the certification of a multiple employer unit”); and
whether certain workers, including agricultural processing workers, ought to
be deemed “employees” based on the Act’s purposes.113
Courts relied on and cited the DER’s data and analyses in their pur-
posivist interpretation of the NLRA throughout the DER’s five-year contri-
bution to Board enforcement and adjudication.114 Most prominently, when
the Supreme Court upheld the NLRA’s constitutionality in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel, it explicitly relied on the DER’s expertise and reports, rein-
forcing the Act’s equal bargaining power purpose by describing “the reason
for labor organizations” stated “[l]ong ago”: “that union was essential to give
laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer.”115 The
Court recognized that the NLRA placed within the Board’s authority the de-
cision on “the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining,”
stating that the Board must make that decision to “effectuate the policies of
this [Act,]” including equal bargaining power.116 After Jones & Laughlin, the
Board ruled that “employers” governed by the Act included multiemployer
associations as agents for constituent employers.117
Thus, the NLRA originally envisioned a broad grant of collective-labor
protections sufficient to counter employers’ asymmetric buyer power in the
employment bargain. Unfortunately, despite this radical start,118 that broad
grant was short-lived. Employers coordinated fierce antiunion resistance
through congressional lobbying (resulting in the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-
Griffin Amendments) and successful campaigns to defang the NLRA’s origi-
nal scope and worker protections in the Board and the courts.119 A Red Scare
112. Id. at 127.
113. 4 NLRB ANN. REP. 155 (1939). For examples of DER-produced evidence in NLRA
cases, see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 & n.8 (1937); Virginia Railway
Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 545–46 & nn. 4–5 (1937); NLRB v. Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 267 & n.2 (1938); H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514,
523–24 & n.1 (1941); and NLRB v. Crowe Coal Co., 104 F.2d 633, 634 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1939). See
also David Ziskind, The Use of Economic Data in Labor Cases, 6 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (1939).
114. See supra note 113. For a detailed account of the Supreme Court’s reliance on DER
data and analysis, see Gross, supra note 16, at 321–22, 332–34.
115. See 301 U.S. at 33; Gross, supra note 16.
116. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(b), 160(c). See generally Kenneth Casebeer, Drafting Wagner’s Act:
Leon Keyserling and the Precommittee Drafts of the Labor Disputes Act and the National Labor
Relations Act, 11 INDUS. RELS. L.J. 73, 77–86, app. (1989) (recounting legislative history).
117. Shipowners’ Ass’n of the Pac. Coast, 7 N.L.R.B. 1002, 1024–25 (1938); see also 29
U.S.C. § 152(1)–(2).
118. Klare, supra note 18, at 265–66, 281–89.
119. See, e.g., JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR
RELATIONS POLICY, 1947–1994 (1995); G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, THE HIGHER CIRCLES: THE
GOVERNING CLASS IN AMERICA 156–250 (1970); supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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purge of the Board’s interdisciplinary social scientific experts who informed
its equal bargaining analysis—eliminating DER appropriations and then
statutorily banning Board hiring of economists120—decimated the Board’s
expertise in labor-market regulation, creating a vacuum where the Board
once anchored its justifications and legitimacy on judicial review.121 And
while the durability of other New Deal and post-New Deal social-safety-net
programs—federal welfare programs, social security, Medicare—was fueled
by expert bureaucracies implementing equality-based government
schemes,122 the institutional absence of social science at the Board, combined
with employers’ political pressure and anemically substantiated, formalist
court decisions, narrowed the Act’s scope to decentralized, single-enterprise
bargaining with weak union protections.
The dismantling of workers’ collective structural power occurred in
three broad movements: judicial limitation of workers’ exempted coordina-
tion from the antitrust laws; agency, judicial, and legislative confinement of
workers’ collective rights to single-firm bargaining-unit defaults and expan-
sion of worker exemptions from the NLRA; and agency, judicial, and legisla-
tive narrowing of workers’ substantive rights under Sections 7 and 8 of the
NLRA. The following Subparts detail these.
B. Narrowing Workers’ Collective Rights: Antitrust’s Labor Exemption
Courts first confined workers’ ability to leverage their collective rights
indirectly, by narrowing workers’ antitrust immunity for coordinating
against firms beyond their individual employer. This Subpart explains how
this narrowing occurred, thus chilling and deterring worker coordination. It
argues that, because courts’ analysis neither was informed by labor-market
structure nor contemplated employer wage-setting power and collusion, it
ignored how workers’ collective response beyond their individual employer
might be required to correct employers’ accrued buyer power. This Subpart
further details how, in shaping the parameters of the labor exemption, courts
valued consumer welfare in product markets over worker welfare in labor
markets. Courts did this without fully assessing the short- and long-term
impacts of prioritizing consumer welfare on employers’ buyer power to sup-
press wages and extract unequal surplus from the employment relationship.
Workers initially used the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts’ “statuto-
ry exemption” from antitrust law as a shield to protect their coordinated lev-
erage against their direct employers’ labor-market competitors, indirect
120. SeeHafiz, supra note 15, at 1119–29.
121. See supra text accompanying note 23.
122. See, e.g., DAVID BARTON SMITH, THE POWER TO HEAL: CIVIL RIGHTS, MEDICARE,
AND THE STRUGGLE TO TRANSFORM AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 105–10 (2016); Rah-
man, supra note 58, at 1686–87; Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement:
Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 343–44 (2012).
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employers, and those who dealt with their direct employers.123 Specifically,
workers targeted and struck (1) nonunionized firms to increase union densi-
ty and limit employers’ ability to draw on a reserve army of nonunionized
replacement workers; and/or (2) firms that enabled their employer to ride
out strikes, including suppliers or distribution outlets that serviced their di-
rect employer’s continued operation during work stoppages.124 But courts
eroded that statutory exemption through antitrust common law—the “non-
statutory” labor exemption—widely subjecting worker strikes and other con-
certed activity to criminal sanction, treble damages, and injunctions.125 The
non-statutory exemption exposes workers to antitrust liability if the primary
effects of their restraints are felt in product rather than labor markets.126 The
most common form of such restraints is conduct—like strikes and union
agreements—aimed at earlier targets of workers’ coordinated leverage: their
direct employer’s nonunionized competitors and suppliers or distributors
that, in servicing that employer’s continued operations during strikes, enable
that employer’s stronger bargaining leverage.127 Such restraints subject un-
ions to liability after balancing national labor policy against antitrust policy:
where the restraint’s effects neither are “intimately related” to nor “ “follow
naturally’ from the elimination of competition over wages and working con-
ditions,” courts subject them to antitrust liability.128
Through narrow interpretation of the non-statutory exemption, the Su-
preme Court significantly restructured workers’ bargaining leverage, limit-
ing their lawful coordinated action outside of single-firm bargaining.129
Beginning in 1965, in UMW v. Pennington, the Court held that an agreement
between the United Mine Workers and coal producers to secure industry-
wide wage rates higher than what smaller producers could offer was not ex-
empt from antitrust law, even though it concerned a core mandatory subject
of union collective bargaining: wages.130 The Court’s reasoning relied on its
view that the NLRA imposed a default of single-employer bargaining: “[A]
123. For “statutory” labor exemption, see 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 101; and
Marina Lao,Workers in the “Gig” Economy: The Case for Extending the Antitrust Labor Exemp-
tion, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543, 1560–61 (2018).
124. DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO
CORPORATE LIBERALISM 71–72, 167–69 (1995).
125. For “non-statutory exemption,” see, for example, Lao supra note 123, at 1543, 1561
n.73, and Douglas L. Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1192–224
(1980).
126. Randall Marks, Labor and Antitrust: Striking a Balance Without Balancing, 35 AM.
U. L. REV. 699, 718–19, 731 (1986).
127. See id. at 730–44.
128. Id. at 736–43.
129. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616 (1975); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Local Union No. 189 v.
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797
(1945).
130. 381 U.S. at 661–69.
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union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws when it . . . has agreed
with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining
units.”131 Thus, despite NLRA sanctioning of industry-wide bargaining
through multiemployer bargaining units, the Court imposed a “unit-by-
unit” bargaining rule. That rule restrained unions from reaching interfirm
wage agreements that sought to pressure nonunionized producers by sub-
jecting them to antitrust liability. A multiemployer agreement remains law-
ful if it is “intimately related” to labor conditions and pursues a union’s own
labor policies rather than policies furthering a union-employer conspiracy to
reduce competition downstream.132
But distinguishing between agreements aimed at labor and those aimed
at product-market conditions is challenging. The Court’s definitive attempt
is Connell Construction, where a local union picketed a general contractor
for refusing to agree to subcontract its mechanical work only to firms that
had collective bargaining agreements with the union.133 The contractor sued
the union, alleging antitrust violations. The Court found that the union’s
multiemployer subcontracting agreements with general contractors prevent-
ed competition in the subcontracting market because they enabled the union
to exclude nonresident firms. And because the union was not seeking to un-
ionize the general contractor’s employees itself, it could not rely on national
labor policy favoring collective bargaining to shield the agreements under
the labor exemption.134 Thus, as in Pennington, the Court found that the un-
ion forfeited its antitrust exemption by imposing direct market restraints
through an agreement with a nonlabor party—the general contractor—
outside the collective bargaining context. In doing so, the Court formulated a
new test: if anticompetitive effects in product markets “follow naturally from
the elimination of competition over wages and working conditions,” they are
exempt from antitrust and protected under labor law, but if they do not, they
are subject to antitrust law.135 The agreements failed that test and so were not
exempt from antitrust law.
Connell Construction has been widely criticized for failing to coherently
distinguish when exactly anticompetitive effects in product markets—
reductions in output or product quality, or increased prices—“follow natu-
rally” from union agreements that establish labor-market restraints.136 Fur-
ther, in restricting the parameters of the labor exemption to only protect
restraints that have no adverse impact in product markets, the Court func-
tionally extended a consumer-welfare trump to the equal bargaining power
131. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 665–66 (emphasis added).
132. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689–90.
133. 421 U.S. at 618–19.
134. Connell Constr., 421 U.S. at 624–26.
135. Id. at 625.
136. See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor
Law, 62 VA. L. REV. 603 (1976); Hiba Hafiz, Picketing in the New Economy, 39 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1845, 1852 & n.28 (2018).
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goal of American labor law and policy. The Court extended this trump to
make workers liable under antitrust law for coordinating even in circum-
stances where antitrust and labor policy might converge to combat employer
monopsony power in labor markets—in other words, where broader coordi-
nation between workers is necessary to combat employers’ unequal bargain-
ing power that inefficiently suppresses workers’ wages and increases
unemployment. Even worse, empirical evidence suggests that product-
market concentration—and the realities of product-market structures “me-
diated by direct employers but ultimately governed by dominant buyers”—
contributes to labor-market wage stagnation and wage suppression.137 But
workers are vulnerable to antitrust liability if they coordinate to assert coun-
tervailing power against such dominant buyers even through contract, let
alone strikes. And legal uncertainty on the applicability of antitrust liability
to multiemployer, cross-organizational, and industry-wide agreements with
unions has contributed to chilling such agreements. In 1947, between 25%
and 33% of workers were covered by agreements negotiated between unions
and multiemployer associations, encompassing over 4 million workers.138
While the number of unionized private-sector workers declined through the
1970s,139 roughly 2.8 million workers under collective bargaining agreements
covering 1,000 workers or more had multiemployer agreements in 1980,
around 43% of workers.140 That number dramatically fell after Connell Con-
struction and the deregulation and decline of core American industries that
were the nerve center of traditional multiemployer pattern bargaining.141 By
1996, only 25% of employers had pattern-bargaining agreements with work-
ers, and that number has continued to decline to the point that the Office of
Labor-Management Standards no longer tracks it.142 Judicial uncertainty
about the labor exemption’s scope has contributed to a single-employer bar-
gaining default at the expense of collective bargaining mandates grounded in
equal bargaining power assessments.143
137. E.g., Nathan Wilmers, Wage Stagnation and Buyer Power: How Buyer-Supplier Rela-
tions Affect U.S. Workers’ Wages, 1978 to 2014, 83 AM. SOC. REV. 213, 214 (2018).
138. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BULL. NO. 897, COLLECTIVE
BARGAININGWITH ASSOCIATIONS ANDGROUPS OF EMPLOYERS 2 (1947).
139. See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR
186 (rev. & expanded ed. 2013).
140. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BULL. NO. 2095, CHARACTERISTICS OF
MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS, JANUARY 1, 1980, at 19 tbl.1.8 (1981).
141. See HARRY C. KATZ, THOMAS A. KOCHAN & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO U.S. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR RELATIONS 186–87 (5th ed.
2017); see also LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 139, at 126–28, 186–87.
142. Robert C. Marshall & Antonio Merlo, Pattern Bargaining, 45 INT’L ECON. REV. 239,
239 (2004); see Email from OLMS-Public to author (July 17, 2019, 6:15 PM) (on file with the
Michigan Law Review) (stating OLMS ceased collecting multiemployer-bargaining-unit data).
143. See, e.g., Joseph T. Casey, Jr. & Michael J. Cozzillio, Labor-Antitrust: The Problems of
Connell and a Remedy that Follows Naturally, 1980 DUKE L.J. 235, 257–68 (collecting and dis-
cussing cases).
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Finally, labor exemptions from the antitrust laws, if they shield worker
coordination at all, protect only statutory NLRA “employees.” If exempted
workers, like independent contractors (discussed below), coordinate or en-
gage in collective action, they risk injunctions, antitrust liability, and treble
damages. Independent-contractor organizing has become central to policy
discussions about expanding the labor exemption because of both FTC en-
forcement actions and aggressive employer litigation against Uber drivers,
home healthcare and childcare providers, taxi drivers, low-paid truck driv-
ers, and other workers.144
C. Narrowing Workers’ Collective Rights: Bargaining Units and Unprotected
Workers
The second area where Congress, the Board, and the courts entrenched
decentralized, single-enterprise bargaining was through bargaining-unit de-
faults and broad worker exemptions from labor protection. These rules and
exemptions narrow the number and types of workers that can engage in pro-
tected collective action to restrain employer buyer power and restrict the size
of bargaining units that can function as countervailing power against those
employers. Thus, labor-market regulation—through a combination of labor
and antitrust law—restrained and even penalized effective countervailing
worker coordination for large sets of workers, contravening the NLRA’s
equal bargaining power purpose.
First, the Board has used its discretion as the arbiter of bargaining-unit
determinations to establish a single-employer bargaining-unit default, mak-
ing it exceedingly difficult for workers to establish multiemployer bargaining
units. In 1963, the NLRB ruled that “[a] single-plant unit . . . is presumptive-
ly appropriate[] . . . even though another unit, if requested, might also be ap-
propriate.”145 The presumption of a single plant may be rebutted by a
number of considerations: “central control over daily operations and labor
relations, including the extent of local autonomy; similarity of skills, func-
tions, and working conditions; degree of employee interchange; distance be-
tween locations; and bargaining history, if any.”146 None of these
considerations directly include analysis of workers’ relative bargaining pow-
er over their employer in a given labor market.
This default creates perverse incentives for employer manipulation. If a
union demands recognition for a smaller bargaining unit, the employer can
reject it by arguing that the union lacks majority support in a larger unit,
144. Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collec-
tive Action, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 969, 983–86 (2016); Lao, supra note 123.
145. Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 629, 631 (1962). This in part stemmed from
Democratic Board concerns that larger units would tax union resources and defeat organizing
campaigns where unions lack a sufficient showing of interest plant-wide or across multiple
employers. See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 72–81 (6th ed.
2019).
146. J&L Plate, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 429, 429 (1993).
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forcing the union to petition the Board for an election in the smaller unit.147
Thus, employers get the advantage of a default unit no larger than a single
employer but can burden organizing workers with requiring them to attain
majority support of the largest number of employees that conceivably share a
“community of interest”148 before getting certification to serve as an exclu-
sive bargaining representative. The Board does not consider how exclusively
placing coordination costs to reach majority status on organizing workers
burdens unionization and favors employers’ bargaining position.149 This is
particularly problematic in light of extensive evidence of employers’ success-
ful use of antiunion campaigns and retaliation to thwart unionization ef-
forts.150
To achieve multiemployer units, a majority of workers within each unit
must first designate a single worker organization as their exclusive repre-
sentative.151 The union must then merge the separate units to develop a bar-
gaining structure for collective bargaining.152 The Board can only certify a
multiemployer association as an appropriate “employer unit” if there is a
clear history of stable collective bargaining between it and the union, or,
lacking such a history, by voluntary consent of all employers.153 The union
cannot strike or threaten to strike to pressure employers to join a multiem-
ployer bargaining unit.154 And any employer can leave the arrangement so
long as it clearly announces its intent to do so before a new bargaining
round.155 Thus, for nonlegacy industries, like service-sector industries with
lower union density, workers face a tall order: incur all the coordination
147. MARK BARENBERG, ROOSEVELT INST., WIDENING THE SCOPE OF WORKER
ORGANIZING 13 (2015), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/RI-
Widening-Scope-Worker-Organizing-201510-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5SG-XV9X]; see also
29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (stating that the NLRB has general authority to decide the appropriate unit
size); PCC Structurals, Inc., No. 19-RC-202188 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 28, 2018) (demonstrating the
ability for employers to challenge the unit size).
148. PCC Structurals, Inc., No. 19-RC-202188 (employing the “community of interest”
test in analyzing unit size).
149. See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Law, Organizing, and Status Quo Vulnerability, 96 TEX.
L. REV. 351, 360–61, 374 (2017); see also Bruce E. Kaufman & David I. Levine, An Economic
Analysis of Employee Representation, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 149 (Bruce E.
Kaufman & Daphne Gottlieb Taras eds., 2000).
150. See, e.g., CELINE MCNICHOLAS, MARGARET POYDOCK, JULIA WOLFE, BEN ZIPPERER,
GORDON LAFER & LOLA LOUSTAUNAU, ECON. POL’Y INST., UNLAWFUL (2019), https://www
.epi.org/files/pdf/179315.pdf [https://perma.cc/NV8L-BBGS]; KATE BRONFENBRENNER, ECON.
POL’Y INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 235, NO HOLDS BARRED: THE INTENSIFICATION OF
EMPLOYER OPPOSITION TO ORGANIZING (2009), https://www.epi.org/files/page/-
/pdf/bp235.pdf [https://perma.cc/LV8E-ZCEF].
151. See 29 U.S.C. § 159.
152. See, e.g., Mohawk Bus. Machs. Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 248 (1956).
153. Arden Farms, 117 N.L.R.B. 318, 319 (1957); York Transfer & Storage Co., 107
N.L.R.B. 139, 142 (1953).
154. See Kroger Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 569 (1964).
155. McAnary &Welter, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 1029, 1031 (1956).
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costs of unionizing across multiple employers and convince each to recog-
nize a multiemployer bargaining structure.
In addition to these challenges, workers’ collective rights have been nar-
rowed by congressional, agency, and judicial exemptions of large numbers of
workers from labor protections. The most prominent of these are “inde-
pendent contractors,” although the managerial and supervisorial worker ex-
emption is also significant.156 In the fissured workplace, where employers
have severed legal obligations to workers through subcontracting and out-
sourcing—“misclassifying” employees as nonemployees—and promoting
employees through pro forma job-classification titles—“overclassifying” em-
ployees as managerial or supervisory—they have withered the number of
workers eligible for protected bargaining units that function as sources of
countervailing power.157 Domestic and agricultural workers are also exempt
from NLRA coverage.158 These exemptions neither track economic determi-
nations of employers’ buyer power nor align with ensuring equal bargaining
power between employers and NLRA-protected employees that work along-
side exempted workers.
D. Narrowing Workers’ Section 7 Rights and Unfair Labor Practices
Finally, Congress, the Board, and the courts confined workers’ collective
rights through NLRA amendments and Board and court interpretations of
the NLRA, which, combined, favored employer buyer power over workers’
countervailing power. First, the Board and the courts circumscribed the
range of workers’ section 7-protected rights to engage in concerted activity,
including strikes and procedural forms of collective action in the courts.
Congress also amended section 8 of the NLRA in the 1947 and 1959 Taft-
Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Amendments to extend ULP sanctions origi-
nally applicable only to employer misconduct to unions’ conduct.159 The
156. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
157. SeeWEIL, supra note 19, at 77–78.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). For the racist and sexist origins of NLRA worker exclusions, see,
for example, Juan F. Perea, The Echoes of Slavery: Recognizing the Racist Origins of the Agricul-
tural and Domestic Worker Exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act, 72 OHIO ST. L.J.
95 (2011).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b). It could be argued that the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin
Amendments’ exemptions and protection of worker rights to refrain from union activities and
representation supersede or conflict with the NLRA’s equal bargaining power purpose. See,
e.g., Fisk & Malamud, supra note 23, at 2033–38. However, while Board and court interpreta-
tions of the NLRA have mostly ignored this purpose, Taft-Hartley retained the Preamble’s lan-
guage stating the statute’s equal bargaining power purpose. See 29 U.S.C. § 151. Landrum-
Griffin arguably fortified this purpose in reiterating that its amendments to the Act were neces-
sary to eliminate and prevent employer practices that “caus[e] diminution of employment and
wages” that “substantially . . . impair or disrupt the market for goods” in “channels of com-
merce,” a concern identical with eliminating and preventing employer buyer power that artifi-
cially suppresses labor inputs and/or wages that can harm consumers. 29 U.S.C. § 401(c)(4).
Further, the legislative history indicates that the Amendments, at least on their face, sought “to
restore equality of bargaining power” by establishing equal duties and obligations on unions as
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1935 Congress had not viewed it as necessary to grant employers tools under
the labor law to sanction union conduct due to their assessment of employ-
ers’ unequal bargaining power. But the 1947 and 1959 Amendments not only
extended sanctionable ULPs to unions for refusing to collectively bargain
and coercing individual workers to join a union but also sanctioned a wide
range of worker conduct capable of exerting economic pressure on employ-
ers. In perhaps the most severe blow to workers’ ability to exercise counter-
vailing power, Congress banned workers from engaging in secondary
activity, or boycotts and strikes of those with whom a primary employer
deals to pressure their primary employer.160 Even where “secondary” entities
have buyer power over workers’ wages and working conditions, workers
cannot collectively exert economic pressure on them to equalize their bar-
gaining power.161 Further, the NLRB and the courts interpreted sanctions
against unions broadly and sanctions against employers narrowly, providing
no analysis of that doctrinal evolution’s impact on workers’ relative bargain-
ing power.
1. Section 7 Labor Rights
As discussed, the very language of workers’ section 7 rights derives from
statutes exempting worker actions from antitrust scrutiny based in part on a
national labor policy to ensure equal bargaining power. The rights granted
under section 7—“to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organi-
zations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,” as well as “the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities”—form the core of workers’ ability to con-
solidate countervailing power against employers.162 For a worker action,
such as a strike, to be protected, it must be a (1) “concerted” and (2) “pro-
tected” activity concerning the interests of employees as employees, as devel-
oped under NLRB and judge-made common law.163 If the activity is found
unlawful, then it is unprotected under the NLRA, but concerted activity can
employers. 93 CONG. REC. 3836 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft); see also id. at 3835 (explaining
Taft-Hartley’s aim “to get back to the point where, when an employer meets with his employ-
ees, they have substantially equal bargaining power . . . . If there is reasonable equality at the
bargaining table, I believe that there is much more hope for labor peace.”). Additionally, Con-
gress envisioned equal bargaining power to be a policy anchored in amendments to the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts—antitrust statutes that survive independently of amendments to the
NLRA. See supra Section I.A. In pari materia principles require construing the NLRA and the
labor exemption of the antitrust statutes in harmony with each other where the statutes are an
“integrated scheme” of regulation. See CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 487
(2011).
160. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4).
161. See Hafiz, supra note 136, at 1893–95 (proposing “market power” test for discerning
boundaries of protected secondary activity).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
163. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc., v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–70 (1978).
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be unprotected without being unlawful.164 If workers engage in unprotected
activity, employers can lawfully discharge them, and workers can be en-
joined and fined for engaging in secondary activity.
Section 7 is amenable to an equal bargaining power analysis, even if such
analysis has been rare in the postwar period. A seminal Burger Court deci-
sion, NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc.,165 illustrates the rare exception. In
an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court construed
workers’ section 7 right to engage in “concerted activity” as extending to an
individual worker’s conduct based on the equal bargaining power purpose of
the statute. City Disposal considered whether a garbage truck driver’s refusal
to drive an unsafe truck was “concerted activity.”166 In holding it was, the
Court found that the driver’s refusal stemmed from an employer-granted
right in a collective bargaining agreement not to require driving vehicles in
unsafe operating condition.167 Justice Brennan traced section 7’s “concerted
activities” language to “Congress’ first attempt to equalize the bargaining
power of management and labor, . . . its first use of the term ‘concert’ in this
context, came in 1914 with the . . . Clayton Act.”168 He tied that language to
the NLRA through the Norris-La Guardia Act and section 7 of the NIRA,
concluding that “Congress sought generally to equalize the bargaining power
of the employee with that of his employer by allowing employees to band to-
gether in confronting an employer regarding the terms and conditions of
their employment.”169 The Court found no indication Congress intended to
limit “concerted activity” to group activities, finding instead an intent “to
create an equality in bargaining power between the employee and the em-
ployer throughout the entire process of labor organizing, collective bargain-
ing, and enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements.”170 The Court
based the legal authority that individual employees may engage in NLRA-
protected “concerted activity”171 “on a recognition that the potential inequal-
ity in the relationship between the employee and the employer continues be-
yond the point at which a collective bargaining agreement is signed,
mitigates that inequality throughout the duration of the employment rela-
tionship, and is, therefore, fully consistent with congressional intent.”172
164. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255 (1939).
165. 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
166. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 825.
167. Id. at 839.
168. Id. at 834.
169. Id. at 835.
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966).
172. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 835 (emphasis added). Justice Brennan’s 1984 inter-
pretation of section 7 in terms of the NLRA’s equal bargaining power purpose evolved as a re-
jection of his earlier, more formalist approach in NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ International
Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). See infra notes 188–191 and accompanying text. His later view is
more consistent with his opinion in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 257, 262 (1975),
which interpreted section 8 in light of the NLRA’s equal bargaining power purpose to find that
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But Justice Brennan’s section 7 jurisprudence in City Disposal is an out-
lier: the Board and the courts have otherwise abdicated anchoring interpreta-
tion of the scope of protected “concerted activity” on ensuring equal
bargaining power between labor and capital. In failing to incorporate bar-
gaining-power analysis either in their reasoning in individual cases or in as-
certaining the cumulative impacts of their decisions, the Board and the
courts significantly eroded workers’ ability to assert countervailing power
against employers, particularly through strikes,173 finding almost always un-
protected wildcat strikes;174 mass picketing;175 sympathy strikes;176 strikes
over employers’ refusal to bargain over “permissive” subjects of bargaining
like plant closures, capital allocations, and other strategic management deci-
sions;177 modification strikes to alter collective bargaining agreements;178 and
virtually all “inside actions” such as sit-down strikes, slowdowns, partial
strikes (refusing to perform all tasks while on the job), overtime strikes (re-
fusing to work overtime), and intermittent, or on-and-off, strikes for por-
tions of time.179 Strike potency was also dramatically limited by granting
employers broad self-help options when they occur. For example, workers
an employer subjecting an employee to an investigatory interview without a requested union
representative was a ULP. There, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, reiterated that the Act
“is designed to eliminate the ‘inequality of bargaining power between employees . . . and em-
ployers’ ” and that “[r]equiring a lone employee to attend an investigatory interview which he
reasonably believes may result in the imposition of discipline perpetuates the inequality the Act
was designed to eliminate, and bars recourse to the safeguards the Act provided ‘to redress the
perceived imbalance of economic power between labor and management.’ ” Id. at 262 (quoting
Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965)).
173. See White, supra note 61, at 1096–1110; James Gray Pope, How American Workers
Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518, 528 (2004) (examining five key
labor law doctrines that hollowed out workers’ right to strike); Klare, supra note 18, at 267 (ar-
guing that American law has overseen “a diminution of labor’s combativeness”).
174. Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 60–70 (1975)
(holding wildcat strikes unprotected).
175. See Ahmed A. White,Workers Disarmed: The Campaign Against Mass Picketing and
the Dilemma of Liberal Labor Rights, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 59, 59 (2014).
176. White, supra note 61, at 1110 (“Section 8(b)(4) of the Taft-Hartley Act imposed a
broad ban on secondary boycotts, thus effectively prohibiting sympathy strikes and general
strikes.”).
177. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (holding
employers’ duty to bargain limited to mandatory, not permissive, subjects).
178. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280, 284–89 (1956) (stating strikes to
modify collective bargaining agreement with no-strike clause unprotected).
179. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 246, 252 (1939) (holding sit-
downs unprotected); In re Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 337–38 (1950) (holding slow-
downs unprotected); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 496 (8th Cir. 1946)
(holding partial strikes unprotected); C.G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390, 397 (7th Cir.
1939) (holding overtime strikes unprotected); Int’l Union, UAW, Local 232 v. Wis. Emp. Rels.
Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 264 (1949) (holding “that this recurrent or intermittent unannounced stop-
page of work to win unstated ends was neither forbidden by Federal statute nor was it legalized
and approved thereby”). See also First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 678–79, 686
(1981) (holding plant closings permissive subjects and thus unprotected).
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engaging in “economic” strikes—strikes over wages, hours, and working
conditions against employers that have not violated the labor law—can be
permanently replaced, and picketing to pressure employers to recognize un-
ions is drastically limited.180 Employers can enjoin union strikes pending ar-
bitration over disputes subject to collective-bargaining-agreement arbitra-
arbitration clauses, but courts only occasionally allow unions to preserve the
status quo under the same circumstances. In those circumstances, workers
must comply with the employer’s change subject to resolution of grievance
procedures, and unless irreparable harm is shown, employers can terminate
employees if they violate this “obey now, grieve later” rule.181
The Supreme Court further narrowed worker protections when it held
in Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis that class and collective actions are not
protected “concerted activities” under section 7.182 So when employers im-
pose class and collective action waivers in employment contracts, they do
not violate the NLRA, nor do they violate the NLRA by requiring workers to
sign mandatory arbitration agreements—on threat of being fired—after they
are asked to “opt in” to class actions.183 The Court’s recent turn is consistent
with Lochner-era positioning of workers and employers in a formal equality
as “free choosers,” even while viewing union agreements with workers as
“coercive,” like in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Munici-
pal Employees, Council 31.184
2. Section 8 Unfair Labor Practices
The Board and the courts have disproportionately restricted workers’
countervailing power against employers by interpreting union ULPs broadly
while interpreting employer ULPs narrowly.185 Workers’ section 7 rights are
protected from employer intrusion under section 8 of the Act—specifically,
section 8(a)(1)—which makes it a ULP for employers “to interfere with, re-
180. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel., 304 U.S. 333, 345–46 (1938) (economic strikes); 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (curtailing protections for representation strikes).
181. Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Lever Broth-
ers Co. v. Int’l Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976); James B. At-
leson, Forum, The Circle of Boys Market: A Comment on Judicial Inventiveness, 7 INDUS. RELS.
L.J. 88, 101 (1985).
182. 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018).
183. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 U.S. at 1632; Cordúa Rests., Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 43, slip op. at
1 (Aug. 14, 2019).
184. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Consent, Coercion, and Employment
Law, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 411, 414–19 (2020); Charlotte Garden, Epic Systems v. Lewis:
The Return of Freedom of Contract in Work Law?, 2017–2018 AM. CONST. SOC’Y SUP. CT. REV.
137, 159.
185. Cf. Kate Andrias, The Fortification of Inequality: Constitutional Doctrine and the
Political Economy, 93 IND. L.J. 5, 15 (2018) (outlining judicial “reinforc[ement of] inegalitarian
distributions of power” in labor cases); Julius G. Getman, The NLRB: What Went Wrong and
Should We Try to Fix It, 64 EMORY L.J. 1495, 1496–98 (2015) (collecting cases).
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strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of” their section 7 rights.186 But in
the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the NLRA, Congress
added a series of ULPs—the section 8(b) series—sanctioning a range of un-
ion conduct, including interfering with employees’ section 7 rights and vio-
lating collective bargaining duties.187
A 1960 Supreme Court decision, NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ Internation-
al Union, in part generated this imbalance.188 In that case, a union engaged
in a slowdown during collective bargaining negotiations, and the Board is-
sued a cease-and-desist order, finding the slowdown indicative of the union’s
refusal to bargain in good faith under section 8(b)(3).189 The Court set aside
the order as based merely on the fact that
tactics designed to exert economic pressure were employed during the
course of the good-faith negotiations. Thus the Board in the guise of de-
termining good or bad faith in negotiations could regulate what economic
weapons a party might summon . . . . And if the Board could regulate the
choice of economic weapons . . . it would . . . exercise considerable influ-
ence upon the substantive terms on which the parties contract. . . . Our la-
bor policy is not presently erected on a foundation of government control
of the results of negotiations. Nor does it contain a charter for the [NLRB]
to act at large in equalizing disparities of bargaining power between em-
ployer and union.190
The Court found no indication that Congress meant the Board “to de-
fine . . . what economic sanctions might be permitted negotiating parties in
an ‘ideal’ or ‘balanced’ state of collective bargaining.”191
In justifying its reversal of the Board, the Court conflated two analytical-
ly distinct Board authorities: (1) to intervene in impacting the substance of
collective bargaining terms; and (2) to evaluate, based on its expertise, what
tools the law offers to equalize the bargaining leverage of capital and labor
outside the bargaining room, regardless and independently of the substan-
tive outcomes. In other words, it conflated regulating bargaining outcomes
with regulating the bargaining process. And in doing so, the Court appeared
to assume that Board restraint from assessing tools of economic pressure
would not impact substantive bargaining outcomes or workers’ ability to or-
ganize unions and bargain on an equal playing field with employers.192
In fact, cumulative Board and court rulings did create an unbalanced
bargaining process favoring employers’ bargaining leverage relative to un-
186. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–158.
187. Id. § 158(b).
188. 361 U.S. 477 (1960). But see supra note 182.
189. Insurance Agents’, 361 U.S. at 479–81.
190. Id. at 490 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
191. Id. at 499–500.
192. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 COLUM. L. REV.
451, 452 (1920) (“[E]ach party to the contract, by the threat to call on the government to en-
force his power over the liberty of the other, imposes the terms of the contract on the other.”).
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ions and organizing workers. First, the scope of unions’ sanctionable con-
duct expanded. Most importantly for confining union density and decentral-
izing bargaining, section 8(b)(4) of the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin
Amendments prohibited unions and their agents from engaging, inducing,
or encouraging “secondary activity.”193 Secondary boycotts and strikes were
so potent before the statutory ban that Richard Trumka, current president of
the AFL-CIO, stated he would abolish the entire NLRA to rid the labor
movement of section 8(b)(4).194 The provisions made it a ULP for unions
and their agents to “threaten, coerce, or restrain” other “secondary” or “neu-
tral” employers to join forces with them in boycotting or refusing to deal
with their immediate employer during labor disputes.195 It also prohibited
inducing or encouraging another employer’s employees to “strike
or . . . refus[e] in the course of his employment” to deal with or handle a di-
rect employer’s goods or services.196 In distinguishing between “primary”
and “secondary” employers, the Board has viewed “secondaries” broadly to
include all employers not in a direct employment relationship with statutori-
ly protected employees, with narrow exceptions: (1) “allies,” or otherwise
neutral employers performing struck work of a primary employer; and (2)
“single employers” sharing interrelation of operations and common owner-
ship, management, and centralized control of labor relations with a direct
employer.197 This overbroad definition of secondaries even limits workers
from engaging in secondary activity against employers who agree to wage fix
with direct employers, have no-poaching agreements with direct employers,
and have monopsony power over a direct employer’s employees. The labor
law makes no assessment of wage-setting power when it determines which
entities employees may boycott or strike.198 The secondary activity ban has
overwhelmingly curtailed workers’ concerted activity against nonemployers,
including indirect employers, a problem all the more severe in the fissured
workplace where work arrangements are fragmented and obligations are
shared between a number of employers through subcontracting, outsourc-
ing, franchising, and other supply-chain arrangements.199 And it restricts
unions’ free expression in ways not tolerated in almost any First Amend-
193. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4).
194. See Richard L. Trumka, Why Labor Law Has Failed, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 871, 881
(1987); Hafiz, supra note 123, at 1849–50.
195. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4).
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Nat’l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 627 (1967) (“ally doc-
trine”); Int’l Union, United Mine Workers, 301 N.L.R.B. 872, 873 (1991) (“single employer”
doctrine).
198. See Hafiz, supra note 136, at 1876–901 (discussing this and proposing “market pow-
er” defense for secondary activity).
199. Id. at 1850–51.
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ment setting, imposing viewpoint- and speaker-discriminatory restrictions
on union speech.200
But the Board and the courts also interpreted union ULPs in ways that
chipped away at workers’ options for recourse when employers refuse to
recognize their union, make take-it-or-leave-it offers, or make corporate de-
cisions that impact their wages and working conditions. For example, a un-
ion’s ability to impose economic pressure by striking during collective
bargaining negotiations, as discussed, is unprotected if it concerns “permis-
sive” subjects of bargaining.201 Employers can enjoin and even fire strikers
for doing so without committing a ULP, and they can impose the same retal-
iation if their workers engage in coercive “misconduct”202 or refuse to cross
another union’s picket line if the collective bargaining agreement between
the employees’ union and that employer contains a no-strike clause.203
Conversely, the Board and the courts have been lenient in interpreting
whether employers have committed ULPs. They have found that it is not a
ULP for employers to permanently replace economic strikers;204 temporarily
replace strikers protesting employer ULPs;205 offensively or defensively lock
out workers;206 limit reinstatement rights of strikers who risk damage to em-
ployers’ property;207 or unilaterally change a collective bargaining agreement
if they bargain to an impasse or unilaterally act without union consent if a
mandatory term is not clearly in the collective bargaining agreement.208 The
courts have also limited public benefits to striking workers in ways that re-
duce their bargaining power, holding that striking workers are ineligible for
food stamps.209
* * *
In sum, workers’ collective rights and bargaining power have been ap-
preciably eroded, first by Congress and then more profoundly by the NLRB
and the courts. To be clear, this Article does not contend that all restraints
200. Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of the First Amendment: Past as Pro-
logue, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2057, 2072–73 (2018).
201. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
202. See, e.g., Consol. Commc’ns, 367 N.L.R.B. No. 7, slip op. at 2 (Oct. 2, 2018); Univer-
sal Truss, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 733, 735 (2006).
203. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 80–81 (1953).
204. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345–46 (1938).
205. SeeMastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956).
206. See, e.g., Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 307–10 (1965); NLRB v. Brown
Food Store, 380 U.S. 278, 283–84 (1965); Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447, 448
(1954).
207. See, e.g., NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir.
1955).
208. See Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484
U.S. 539, 833 n.5 (1988).
209. See Lyng v. Int’l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 368 (1988).
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on workers’ labor rights are categorically or theoretically inconsistent with
furthering an equal bargaining power purpose. It merely argues that, for the-
oretical,210 empirical,211 and historically contingent reasons—due in no small
part to regulatory and doctrinal decisions discussed in this Part that failed to
contend with labor-market realities that favor employer bargaining power
over workers—government regulators have rigged labor-market regulation
of workers’ collective rights in favor of employers’ buyer power. For those
reasons, regulation should err on the side of avoiding false negatives, or Type
2 errors (mistakes of not finding that workers are in a weaker bargaining po-
sition relative to employers when in fact they are), as opposed to erring on
the side of avoiding false positives, or Type 1 errors (mistakes of finding that
workers are in a weaker bargaining position relative to employers when in
fact they are not).212
Because our current law makes no accommodation to the NLRA’s equal
bargaining power purpose, it perpetuates a legal misalignment dissipating
workers’ countervailing power as against employers by instituting a decen-
tralized, single-enterprise-based system of containing that power. This misa-
lignment has occurred at the same time workplace restructuring has replaced
highly centralized industrial employment and evidence mounts of pervasive
employer buyer power that artificially suppresses workers’ wages, exacerbat-
ing nearly unprecedented economic inequality.213 This failure to properly
regulate imperfect competition in labor markets increases already-high
worker-coordination costs, making it more difficult to establish workers’
countervailing power against employers. And it perpetuates distortions in
those markets that do not only harm workers. It reduces tax revenues col-
lected from income; overburdens social-safety-net programs that end up
subsidizing powerful employers; burdens overstrained agency enforcement;
and places the bulk of any compliance on intermediated, smaller employers,
raising their costs and creating interfirm inequality that further strengthens
lead “superstar” firms. 214
210. On justifications for presuming imperfect competition in labor markets as a theoret-
ical matter, see infra note 224 and accompanying text.
211. For empirical evidence of employers’ buyer power, see infra notes 229–231, 347–348
and accompanying text.
212. For Type 1 and Type 2 errors, see generally Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out
of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 2, 5–6
(2015); Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies
and Polyarchies, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 716 (1986); and Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Anti-
trust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984) (applying an error-cost framework to judicial regulation of mar-
ket restraints and market power).
213. See supra notes 10–11; José Azar, Emiliano Huet-Vaughn, Ioana Marinescu, Bledi
Taska & Till von Wachter, Minimum Wage Employment Effects and Labor Market Concentra-
tion (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26101, 2019).
214. See MICHAEL J. PIORE & ANDREW SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION:
PROTECTING WORK AND WORKERS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 18–40 (2018); WEIL, su-
pra note 19, at 7–27.
Michigan Law Review
But it would neither be methodologically impracticable nor contravene
current law for the Board to take its mandate of ensuring equal bargaining
power seriously.215 The next Part covers the social science tools relevant for
the Board and courts’ analysis of equal bargaining power, while the final Part
explains how they could be integrated into three core areas of the NLRA’s
administration to better establish structural labor rights.
II. EQUAL BARGAINING POWER AND SOCIAL SCIENCE DEVELOPMENTS
The social science literature analyzing employer buyer power, and bar-
gaining power more broadly, has grown in theoretical nuance and empirical
depth. While scholars have been skeptical of the conceptual utility and regu-
latory purchase of equal bargaining power as obscure or difficult to adminis-
ter, this Part argues that these developments offer analytical precision and
substantive content for identifying when parties’ bargaining power is une-
qual, discerning conditions that strengthen and weaken parties’ relative bar-
gaining power, and developing remedies to equalize it.216 Based on social
scientific contributions, this Part develops a generalized and administrable
conception of equal bargaining power as a standard best approximating
placement of both parties—workers and employers—in a bargaining posi-
tion from which they could hold out indefinitely. Because both parties’ inter-
ests collapse into each other only upon an indefinite holdout—since it would
result in a total shutdown of production bankrupting the employer and forc-
ing workers out of a job—that bargaining position best simulates an equal
playing field and effectuates achieving an equal distribution of the gains of
215. While the NLRA has multiple, and arguably conflicting, purposes, see generally
James A. Gross, Conflicting Statutory Purposes: Another Look at Fifty Years of NLRB Law Mak-
ing, 39 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 7 (1985), ensuring equal bargaining power is consistent with
and even services the NLRA’s other primary goal of ensuring the free flow of commerce. See
supra text accompanying note 108.
216. For detractors of equal bargaining power as an analytical concept, see, for example,
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 101–04 (3d ed. 1986) (questioning “wheth-
er the concept of unequal bargaining power is fruitful, or even meaningful”); David Cabrelli &
Rebecca Zahn, Civic Republican Political Theory and Labour Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LABOUR LAW 104, 105 (Hugh Collins, Gillian Lester & Virginia Mantou-
valou eds., 2019) (arguing unequal bargaining power “lacks clarity in its concept”); Bagchi, su-
pra note 94, at 580 (“[B]argaining power disparity does not capture the moral problem raised
by inequality in the employment relation . . . .”); and Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Pater-
nalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Une-
qual Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 623 (1982) (stating that unequal bargaining power
doctrine “may be internally incoherent”). But see RUTH DUKES, THE LABOUR CONSTITUTION:
THE ENDURING IDEA OF LABOUR LAW 212 (2014) (arguing for equalizing bargaining power
through labor law because it is “tied . . . more broadly to questions of power relations and hu-
man freedom”); Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, supra note 53, at
408–09 (“It would be naïve to expect . . . courts . . . to measure bargaining power with complete
precision. Still, implementing a regime with error . . . is better than nothing. Moreover, in some
situations crude approximations of relative bargaining power are likely to be correct, even if
imperfect. . . . In fact, courts already quite regularly refer to bargaining power as a factor that
justifies case outcomes [citing unconscionability, duress, and contra proferentum doctrines].”).
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trade. For those reasons, achieving the NLRA’s equal bargaining power pur-
pose is consistent with and furthers its labor peace goals.217 Simulating indef-
inite equilibrium in the negotiation game between labor and capital can
compel more efficient agreement on an equal share of gains because it struc-
tures negotiation rules in the shadow of a result that would make both worse
off. Therefore, integrating bargaining-power analysis into core aspects of la-
bor law enforcement is both a pragmatic and effective mechanism that
would further labor policy.218
Social scientific scholarship has devised tools to ascertain parties’ rela-
tive holdout ability and provided experimental data on correctives for bar-
gaining power imbalances. Their contributions can be schematically
organized as assessing bargaining power under four crucial categories: “ex-
ternal,” “transactional,” “internal,” and “distributional.” Labor-economics
and industrial-organization research supplies “external” accounts of employ-
er buyer power: assuming the inside of a firm is a “black box,” they focus on
the labor market outside the firm to ascertain how labor-market concentra-
tion, labor-market structure, and employers’ market share give an individual
employer (or a certain number of employers) buyer power in the market for
workers’ services. “Transactional” accounts—primarily developed in microe-
conomic, bargaining, negotiation, and game theory—concentrate on theo-
retically and experimentally discerning bargaining power within the
bargaining process between parties, whether within or outside the firm,
based on a range of bargaining constraints. These accounts theorize and
evaluate bargaining under conditions of short- and long-term, or relational,
contracting, including bargaining in employment contracts between labor
and capital. “Internal” bargaining-power accounts from behavioral econom-
ics, labor and industrial relations, labor economics, and organizational psy-
chology and behavior open up the “black box” of the firm. They allow
analysis of how internal relationships between workers and management
contribute to or counter employer buyer power, whether through cognitive
heuristics, group dynamics, participatory structures and institutions like la-
bor unions, and management decisionmaking concerning compensation
structures and productivity controls. Finally, “distributional” accounts—
primarily centered in macroeconomic research—focus on labor’s share of
217. See 29 U.S.C. § 151. Assuming perfect information, equal bargaining power can re-
duce strike length because parties know counterparties can hold out indefinitely, and vice ver-
sa, increasing the perceived costs of striking and incentives to avoid them. NOLANMCCARTY &
ADAM MEIROWITZ, POLITICAL GAME THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 275–80 (2007); MARTIN J.
OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, BARGAINING AND MARKETS 104–07 (1990); Layman E. Allen,
Games Bargaining: A Proposed Application of the Theory of Games to Collective Bargaining, 65
YALE L.J. 660, 687 & n.40 (1956).
218. I emphasize “pragmatic” based on a long history of political obstacles limiting more
radical solutions to the inequality between labor and capital. See infra notes 42–43 and accom-
panying text. A new political landscape more amenable to systemic labor law reform could bet-
ter ensure distributive gains at the site of production, assuming tax and other reforms fail in
their redistributive roles in combating inequality.
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national income or profits relative to capital, finding unequal shares indica-
tive of unequal bargaining power on industry- and nationwide scales.219
Bringing each of these categorical approaches to bear on the employment
bargain will be key for fully understanding the relative bargaining power of
labor and capital in the labor law.
This Part summarizes these social scientific developments with an eye
toward explaining their utility in sharpening labor law rules to ensure work-
ers’ countervailing power. It outlines how each field’s methods, models, and
benchmarks offer fruitful approaches to understanding the dynamics of the
employment bargain.
A. Bargaining Power in Labor Economics
Traditional labor-economics modeling assumed labor markets func-
tioned with perfect competition: supply and demand determined worker’s
wages, and bargaining power was irrelevant.220 But increasingly, labor econ-
omists view it as more appropriate to model labor markets “as imperfectly
competitive, subject to monopsony-like effects, collusive behavior by
firms . . . and surpluses that are bargained over.”221 In addition to collusion,
they view market failures—information asymmetries, search frictions, job-
lock effects, job differentiation, heterogeneous preferences, and mobility
costs—as pervasive.222 Employers are thus more properly understood as
wage setters rather than wage takers.223
Empirical research supports this model of imperfect labor-market com-
petition, demonstrating firm monopsony power and rising labor-market
concentration leading to wage suppression; “high variability in pay for work-
ers with identical skills in different industries or firms” or of different gen-
ders or races; minimum wage hikes not increasing unemployment; and firm
reluctance to “raise wages when vacancies are hard to fill.”224 There is also
219. Political theory also offers new insights into theories of domination, offering useful
metrics for benchmarking employer power relative to workers on dimensions of dependency,
power imbalance, and arbitrariness. See, e.g., FRANK LOVETT, A GENERAL THEORY OF
DOMINATION AND JUSTICE (2010); Cabrelli & Zahn, supra note 216, at 104–21; Samuel Bowles
& Herbert Gintis, Power and Wealth in a Competitive Capitalist Economy, 21 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFS. 324 (1992).
220. E.g., Manning, supra note 3, at 3–4; Alan B. Krueger, Princeton Univ. & Nat’l Bu-
reau of Econ. Rsch., Reflections on Dwindling Worker Bargaining Power and Monetary Policy,
Luncheon Address at the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium 1 (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www
.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/sympos/2018/papersandhandouts/824180824krueger
remarks.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2SZ-7XM5].
221. Krueger, supra note 220, at 267–68.
222. See generally Naidu & Posner, supra note 9, at 2–7; Hafiz, supra note 136, at 1874.
223. Krueger, supra note 220.
224. Id.; see, e.g., Doruk Cengiz, Arindrajit Dube, Attila Lindner & Ben Zipperer, The
Effect of Minimum Wages on Low-Wage Jobs, 134 Q.J. ECON. 1405 (2019); Jae Song, David J.
Price, Fatih Guvenen, Nicholas Bloom & Till von Wachter, Firming Up Inequality, 134 Q.J.
ECON. 1, 1–50 (2019); Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Market Concentration -
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increasing evidence of employer collusion and other anticompetitive con-
duct, from wage fixing and no-poaching agreements to the use of noncom-
petes, occupational licensing, and other restraints limiting worker
mobility.225 Current methodologies and empirical studies can more closely
track labor-market realities to ascertain the existence of, and mechanisms
that produce, employer buyer power. Employer buyer power over labor in-
puts is precisely the type of unequal bargaining power the labor law was in-
tended to remedy, so deploying labor economists’ theoretical and empirical
analyses can serve to align labor law enforcement with its original purpose.
Labor economists have also focused on workers’ ability to assert coun-
tervailing power against employers. Specifically, they have studied the im-
pact of bilateral monopoly established through unions, collective bargaining,
and cross-workplace coordination on wages.226 And they assess how the
boundaries of the firm can impact employers’ wage-setting power, differen-
tiating between internal and external wage setting. “Internal labor markets”
are direct employer-employee relationships regulated by internal adminis-
trative rules and procedures. They are characterized by wage premiums and
a range of on-the-job protections and benefits for direct employees. Employ-
er contracts for labor inputs outside the firm form “external labor markets.”
External labor markets are characterized by a range of outsourcing, subcon-
tracting, and other ad hoc or temporary arrangements where wage setting is
determined based on the level of competition for labor inputs in those mar-
kets. In addition, labor economists evaluate how segmented labor markets
impact wage setting in “primary” and “secondary” markets based on the so-
Note by the United States to the Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition,
OECD Doc. DAF/COMP/WD(2018)59 (June 7, 2018), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF
/COMP/WD(2018)59/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/R7WH-XNDT]; Arindrajit Dube, Alan Man-
ning & Suresh Naidu, Monopsony and Employer Mis-optimization Explain Why Wages Bunch
at Round Numbers (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24991, 2020); Wilmers,
supra note 137; Azar et al., supra note 9; Benmelech et al., supra note 11; David Card, Ana Rute
Cardoso, Joerg Heining & Patrick Kline, Firms and Labor Market Inequality: Evidence and
Some Theory, 36 J. LAB. ECON. S13 (2018); Dube et al., supra note 9; Erling Barth, Alex Bryson,
James C. Davis & Richard Freeman, It’s Where You Work: Increases in the Dispersion of Earn-
ings Across Establishments and Individuals in the United States, 34 J. LAB. ECON. S67 (2016);
Douglas A. Webber, Firm-Level Monopsony and the Gender Pay Gap, 55 INDUS. RELS. 323
(2016); Douglas A. Webber, Firm Market Power and the Earnings Distribution, 35 LAB. ECON.
123 (2015).
225. See Hafiz, supra note 7, at 392–402 (collecting sources and cases); Aaron Edlin &
Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupants Face Antitrust Scrutiny?,
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093 (2014).
226. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984)
(discussing efficiency-enhancing functions of unions); Nathan Wilmers, Solidarity Within and
Across Workplaces: How Cross-Workplace Coordination Affects Earnings Inequality, RUSSELL
SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI., Sept. 2019, at 190 (2019); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining
Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91
MICH. L. REV. 419 (1992); Barry T. Hirsch,What Do Unions Do for Economic Performance?, in
WHAT DO UNIONS DO?: A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 193 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E.
Kaufman eds., 2007).
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cietal value of certain labor inputs over others. “Primary” markets offer
higher wages and good working conditions, while “secondary” markets are
characterized by low wages and poorer working conditions.227 These scholars
study the effects of unions on expanding or restricting employment; amelio-
rating or increasing economic inefficiencies; bringing workers’ wages closer
to the opportunity cost of labor; creating dispersion effects on the nonunion
sector; and creating wage inequality.228 In other words, they assess when la-
bor-market institutions can readjust the bargaining imbalance between em-
ployers and workers through correcting employer buyer power that reduces
labor inputs, suppresses workers’ wages, or reduces the quality of employ-
ment conditions.
Thus, scholarship in labor economics takes a broad view of factors im-
pacting employer wage setting—labor-market institutions, industry-wide
and aggregate dispersion effects, the effects of fairness and equity as wage-
setting restraints—and introduces methodological elements of game theory
and negotiation theory (discussed more fully below) to evaluate employers’
and workers’ relative bargaining leverage and best alternatives to a negotiat-
ed agreement. Having developed a theoretical and empirical canon on which
to draw, labor economists can ascertain when workers—direct employees as
well as indirect, outsourced workers—have established (or failed to establish)
countervailing power against purchasers of their services.
B. Market Power in Antitrust Law and Industrial Organization Economics
Industrial organization economics (IO) predicts how employer market
power and conduct impacts workers’ wages, offering social scientists and an-
titrust regulators models and empirical analyses of when employers have
buyer power.229 The dominant structural (or modified structural) IO ap-
proach views the internal workings of the firm as a black box, concentrating
on the structure and behavior of firms in imperfectly competitive markets.230
It applies traditional microeconomic methods and analysis to predict effi-
cient wage setting and ascertain the wage effects of imperfect competition.231
Ideal, efficiency-maximizing outcomes in competitive markets occur when
227. See, e.g., LABORMARKET SEGMENTATION (Richard Edwards, Michael Reich & David
M. Gordon eds., 1973).
228. See, e.g., ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS (3d ed. 1989); John T.
Addison & Barry T. Hirsch, The Economic Effects of Employment Regulation: What Are the
Limits?, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 125 (Bruce
Kaufman ed., 1997); Bruce E. Kaufman, What Unions Do: Insights from Economic Theory, in
WHATDOUNIONS DO?, supra note 226, at 12.
229. See Naidu et al., supra note 3, at 542; see also ADIL ABDELA & MARSHALL
STEINBAUM, ECON. POL’Y INST., LABORMARKET IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED SPRINT–T-MOBILE
MERGER (2018). Standard experimental econometrics are used in conducting empirical as-
sessments of the impact of labor-market concentration and employer buyer power on workers’
wages. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 4 (1988).
230. See TIROLE, supra note 229, at 1–14.
231. See, e.g., id.
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firms set wages at the marginal revenue created due to the increment to out-
put produced by the last worker employed, or the marginal revenue product
(MRP) of labor.
A major assumption of IO is that, under competitive conditions, the
market will set wages based on alternative uses for relatively homogeneous
units of worker productivity and skill. Assuming relatively uniform labor in-
puts, you can expect wage differentiation only based on firms’ acquisition of
market power. IO thus identifies employers’ ability to profitably pay workers
below their MRP as direct evidence of their market power. A firm’s market
share can be indirect evidence of market power—whether the amount of
workers employed or the percentage of total job vacancies posted.232 In the
merger context, market power can be assessed through measures of employ-
er concentration, as in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), or through
measures of “[d]ownward [w]age [p]ressure.”233 In sum, IO models employ-
ers’ ability to suppress wages based on assumptions about how firms exploit
their market position by reducing labor inputs and setting infracompetitive
compensation, adopting wages approximating workers’ MRP as the com-
petitive benchmark.234
Influenced by IO, structural labor economics has developed tools that
attempt to capture the “two-sided nature of differentiation” in labor mar-
kets.235 Labor markets are described as doubly differentiated by employers’
and workers’ heterogeneous preferences that create frictions in employer-
worker matching and employers’ wage-setting or wage-taking ability.236 Such
approaches model and estimate employers’ ability to engage in monopsonis-
tic wage setting, regardless of workers’ outside options, due to lock-in effects,
commuting costs, affordable housing within commuting distance, childcare
options, job information, information asymmetries, dependency on local
networks, and so on.237
Economists, policymakers, and antitrust experts in the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have also developed
useful mechanisms for tempering imbalances between monopsonists and
sellers. Their expertise is key to remedying the impacts of proposed mergers
232. Marinescu & Posner, supra note 50, at 20–21.
233. See Naidu et al., supra note 3, at 539, 578–80.
234. Some IO scholars recognize that wages likely fall below that “because of search fric-
tions and job differentiation” in naturally monopsonistic labor markets. Marinescu & Posner,
supra note 50, at 13.
235. Naidu et al., supra note 3, at 584.
236. Id. For two-sided matching in labor markets, see, for example, Sydnee Caldwell &
Oren Danieli, Outside Options in the Labor Market, SCHOLARS HARV. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://
scholar.harvard.edu/files/danieli/files/danieli_jmp.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Q9R-RWNC]; Edu-
ardo M. Azevedo & Jacob D. Leshno, A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Match-
ing Markets, 124 J. POL. ECON. 1235 (2016); Card et al., supra note 224; Konrad Menzel, Large
Matching Markets as Two-Sided Demand Systems, 83 ECONOMETRICA 897 (2015); and Nikhil
Agarwal, An Empirical Model of the Medical Match, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1939 (2015).
237. See, e.g., Naidu et al., supra note 3, at 555.
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on market concentration and proposing solutions to firm market power in
enforcement actions.238 Injunctive remedies and settlement conditions in an-
titrust cases are designed to diffuse a strong firm’s market power and are rel-
evant for designing solutions to balance employer-union bargaining power
as well, whether through prohibiting specific kinds of conduct; “fencing in”
provisions that limit conduct bringing parties close to repeat violations;
transparency provisions; adjusting property rights through shared use, equal
access, and nondiscrimination duties; or breaking firms apart.239
C. Bargaining Power in Microeconomic, Negotiation, and Game Theory
Game theory and bargaining models have also developed relevant tools
for assessing parties’ relative bargaining power in labor markets. Concentrat-
ing on how a party’s interacting choices under uncertainty produce out-
comes that fulfill or frustrate their preferences or utilities, microeconomic
game and bargaining theory defines bargaining power as the power to make
agreements more favorable to oneself than one’s counterparty; equal bar-
gaining power is when the parties share equally from the gains of trade.240 It
identifies variables that determine negotiation outcomes, sources of bargain-
ing power, and strategies that improve bargaining power, all to assess those
outcomes’ efficiency and distributive properties.241
While simple games begin as two-person zero-sum games with mixed-
strategy equilibria (stable solutions), several-player games can be analyzed as
“cooperative” (players cooperate because of externally enforced restraints,
238. See Hafiz, Interagency Merger, supra note 9. See generally ABA SECTION OF
ANTITRUST L., MARKET POWER HANDBOOK: COMPETITON LAW AND ECONOMIC
FOUNDATIONS 5–8, 13–34 (2d ed. 2012).
239. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Commitment Decisions in Anti-
trust Cases: Note by the United States to the Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs
Competition, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP/WD(2016)23 (June 2, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/873491/download [https://perma.cc/F5JU-792N]; ANTITRUST
DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES (2004),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1175136/download [https://perma.cc/N2A4-DLM6]. The
DOJ and FTC have committed to integrating labor market-effects analysis into merger review
and targeting wage-fixing and no-poaching agreements with limited, if any, follow through.
See [Proposed] Final Judgment, United States v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 1:19-cv-02232
(D.D.C. July 26, 2019) (failing to incorporate labor market-effects analysis in conditional ap-
proval of Sprint-T-Mobile merger); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 33,
at 3; Hearing on the Oversight of the Antitrust L. Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition
Pol’y & Consumer Rts. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 20 (2018) (responses to
questions for the record of Joseph Simons, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n). See generally Ha-
fiz, Interagency Merger, supra note 9.
240. See, e.g., MATTHEW O. JACKSON, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORKS 545 (2008);
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 22 (1960).
241. See generally JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THE THEORY OF
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (60th anniversary ed. 2004); John Nash, Two-Person Coop-
erative Games, 21 ECONOMETRICA 128 (1953); John Nash, Non-cooperative Games, 54 ANNALS
MATH. J. 286 (1951) [hereinafter Nash, Non-cooperative Games]; John F. Nash, Jr., The Bar-
gaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950).
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like law) or “noncooperative” (players do not forge coalitions and agree-
ments are self-enforcing through credible threats or other mechanisms).242
The most basic models assume frictionless bargaining. Frictionless bargain-
ing occurs when there are no transaction costs; the parties have perfect in-
formation; and they can make alternating offers through an infinite time
horizon, as in a chess game where players can witness results of past strate-
gies and engage in sequential moves.243 In standard accounts of frictionless
bargaining, the parties agree to the most efficient terms for surplus allocation
from the bargain.244
More advanced games relax those assumptions, introducing transaction
costs, delay costs (or the benefits of patience), imperfect or asymmetric in-
formation, risk aversion, the availability of outside options, and other varia-
bles.245 Each variable shifts bargaining power in favor of one party in a
bargaining model. For example, patience confers bargaining power because
parties that can delay without costs have more bargaining power relative to
those who cannot delay without significant costs. So employers might be
able to delay without costs because the law allows them to replace workers or
otherwise continue production during a strike. On the other hand, workers
might not be able to delay without significant costs during a strike because
they may have limited strike funds or cannot access unemployment benefits
or food stamps while striking. Likewise, risk aversion reduces bargaining
power, so a player’s bargaining power is higher the less averse she is to risk
relative to her counterparty. And where there are information asymmetries,
delays can be strategies through which privately held information can be
credibly communicated to an uninformed party.246 A party’s bargaining
power increases if she can take action prior to and/or during bargaining ne-
gotiations that would commit her to a favorable position.247 The larger the
cost of revoking a partial commitment, the higher a player’s bargaining pow-
242. See Nash, Non-cooperative Games, supra note 241.
243. See, e.g., Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50
ECONOMETRICA 97 (1982).
244. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Con-
tract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 554 (2003). For debates on agreement to efficient terms, see, for
example, David A. Miller & Joel Watson, A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games with
Bargaining, 81 ECONOMETRICA 2303 (2013) (arguing that attaining efficiency depends on stage
game and bargaining protocol); Choi & Triantis, supra note 53, at 1671–72 (describing when
inefficient terms may result); Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic
Power in Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953, 959, 971 (2006) (finding varia-
tions in nonprice contract terms seeming to correlate with bargaining power).
245. See THE ECONOMICS OF BARGAINING (Ken Binmore & Partha Dasgupta eds., 1987);
Rubinstein, supra note 243.
246. Where legal theorists assume information asymmetries or other market failures,
they draw on IO, which assumes imperfect competition in its modeling. See, e.g., Choi & Tri-
antis, supra note 53.
247. SCHELLING, supra note 240, at 21–27.
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er.248 So, for example, when employers can permanently replace striking
workers during collective bargaining negotiations, “precommiting” them to
locked-in replacement sources of labor inputs before bargaining outcomes
are reached, that places unions in weaker bargaining positions for final bar-
gaining outcomes.
In the labor context, understanding when parties have unequal bargain-
ing power involves determining when labor or management appropriates
more of the surplus through negotiation. Thus, you can discern that “[a]n
employer . . . possess[es] an inequality of bargaining power when he is able
to appropriate more than half the surplus.”249 The bargaining process is
modeled such that the parties agree to a price within a bargaining range that
is defined by their respective reservation prices, or their Best Alternatives to
a Negotiated Settlement (BATNA).250 The lowest point in the bargaining
range is the seller’s BATNA—in employment, the worker’s reservation wage,
or the value of the worker’s next best use of her services. And the highest
point in the range is the buyer’s, or employer’s, BATNA: the value of its next
best use of funds, whether wages for alternative workers or the foregone
benefit of walking away.251 A presumption within the paradigm is that the
point at which the employer and workers agree will be determined by their
“relative patience and risk aversion . . . as they look at the prospect of con-
tinued bargaining and delayed agreement.”252 So more patient, less risk-
averse parties get a larger share of the surplus, assuming perfect infor-
mation.253 The boundaries of the parties’ bargaining range and the wage they
ultimately choose is driven by supply and demand conditions; market con-
centration; private information; patience and risk aversion; and negotiating
skills and strategy.254
In addition to natural market failures that confer monopsony power on
employers, existing legal frameworks—like property law and constitutional
law—and other financial and resource advantages place employers in a
stronger bargaining position relative to workers. For example, access to fi-
nancing and credit, lower discount rates, the marginal value of money, em-
ployers’ higher liquidity, and other considerations award employers more
248. See Yeon-Koo Che & József Sákovics, A Dynamic Theory of Holdup, 72
ECONOMETRICA 1063 (2004).
249. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 974
(1984); see also RANDALL K. FILER, DANIEL S. HAMERMESH &ALBERT E. REES, THE ECONOMICS
OFWORK AND PAY (6th ed. 1996); REES, supra note 228, at 28.
250. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES 97–102,
106 (2d ed. 1991) (“The better your BATNA, the greater your power.”).
251. Choi & Triantis, supra note 53, at 1675.
252. Id.
253. See INGOLF STÅHL, BARGAINING THEORY 121 (1972); Rubinstein, supra note 243, at
108.
254. Choi & Triantis, supra note 53, at 1675. See generally OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra
note 217, 29–65, 50–55 (analyzing factors that affect bargaining outcomes); Ben-Shahar, A Bar-
gaining Power Theory of Default Rules, supra note 53, at 408 (same).
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bargaining power than workers absent labor-market regulation adjusting
workers’ disadvantaged position. But increased demand for or reduced sup-
ply of labor inputs, say, because of a strike, increases workers’ bargaining
power. Unions’ and employers’ respective reservation prices are higher (or
lower) in the absence of other sellers (monopoly) or buyers (monopsony)
than they would be in a competitive market. Informational advantages—
knowing more than the other party or being able to conceal private infor-
mation, like the employer’s valuation of procured services or the value of a
strike fund—shift parties’ relative bargaining power.255 Patience and risk
aversion are a function of increasing one’s own but also decreasing one’s
counterparty’s advantage through negotiation over time. Individual workers
may be more irrationally risk-averse than firms, so patience can be a func-
tion of character traits but also solvency and liquidity constraints, ability to
diversify risks of unfavorable bargaining outcomes, and other considera-
tions.256 And the parties’ ability to engage in sophisticated negotiation tactics
can alter the “actual or perceived reservation price of either party,” shifting
the bargaining range.257
Scholars recommend a number of strategies for more even sharing
where a bargaining-power imbalance is found, including establishing default
rules and disclosure requirements, introducing competition, letting contract-
ing parties renegotiate contracts, and giving the weaker party the opportuni-
ty to dictate bargaining terms with a secured delay.258 Additionally, contract
remedies can be deployed to invalidate contract terms or entire agreements
where overweening power negates genuine consent.259
D. Bargaining in Behavioral Economics, Industrial Relations, and
Organizational Psychology
Labor markets are social institutions where decisionmaking is based on
a wide range of motives and values, including fairness. And social norms can
255. Choi & Triantis, supra note 53, at 1676.
256. Id.; Cass Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 236–
47 (2001).
257. Choi & Triantis, supra note 53, at 1676; see, e.g., AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J.
NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND
EVERYDAY LIFE 291 (1991); G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION
STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE 103–16 (3d ed. 2018); Pierre Cahuc, Fabien Postel-Vinay
& Jean-Marc Robin, Wage Bargaining with On-the-Job Search: Theory and Evidence, 74
ECONOMETRICA 323 (2006) (finding bargaining power increasing from less to more skilled
occupations).
258. Choi & Triantis, supra note 53, at 1673; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 53; Oren Bar-
Gill & Ariel Porat, Disclosure Rules in Contract Law (Harvard Pub. L. Working Paper, Paper
No. 17–34, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2985115 [https://
perma.cc/4V5X-EA4J]; Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, supra note 53.
259. Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, supra note 53, at 873–76.
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constrain bargaining decisions.260 The realities of human cognition, cogni-
tive biases, the psychology of groups, and the intersection of values in the
workplace and broader labor market impact both employers’ and workers’
decisionmaking about productivity and acceptable compensation. Thus,
these realities impact the relative bargaining power of labor and capital—
how much both parties are willing to hold out for better terms. For example,
fairness matters in significant ways when it comes to surplus division, as il-
lustrated by the “ultimatum game.” The “ultimatum game” is a two-player
game where the first player may only make one take-it-or-leave-it offer to
split a $10 pot, but if the second player rejects it, neither receives anything.261
Second players typically reject lowball offers even though they would be bet-
ter off with any amount over nothing, and first players typically anticipate
this, offering between 40 and 50 percent of the pot.262 Employers similarly
face constraints in wage offers based on fairness.263 And workers’ relative
bargaining power suffers from information constraints that distort their
views of entitlement—most workers assume “for cause” rather than “at-will”
employment regimes, for example—and these and other constraints compel
behavioral scientific and industrial-relations tools to identify and analyze
their bargaining power impacts.264 This Subpart describes how developments
in behavioral economics, labor/industrial relations, and organizational psy-
chology reveal the psychological and sociological dimensions of constraints
on labor-market decisionmaking, which, in turn, impact the relative bargain-
ing power of labor and capital.
Behavioral economics examines the impact of relational contracting and
fairness concerns on wage setting and wage taking, considerations that
markedly enhance our understanding of patience, risk aversion, and reserva-
tion wages.265 It also studies labor-market failures caused by heuristics that
restrain firm wage setting, like reciprocity valuations that impact downward
260. See ROBERT M. SOLOW, THE LABOR MARKET AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 3–5, 23
(1990); Jolls et al., supra note 53, at 1502–04.
261. See COLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC
INTERACTION (2003); Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and
Cooperation, 114 Q.J. ECON. 817 (1999).
262. Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 261, at 826.
263. SeeWEIL, supra note 19, at 83–87.
264. See Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why
Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 9 (2002); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning and Law: Ex-
ploring the Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447; Pauline T. Kim,
Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an
At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1997).
265. See, e.g., TRUMAN F. BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON’T FALL DURING A RECESSION
(1999); CAMERER, supra note 261; Ernst Fehr, Lorenz Goette & Christian Zehnder, A Behav-
ioral Account of the Labor Market: The Role of Fairness Concerns, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 355
(2009); Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr & Christian Zehnder, Fairness Perceptions and Reservation
Wages—The Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wage Laws, 121 Q.J. ECON. 1347 (2006); Daniel
Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Enti-
tlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728 (1986).
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wage rigidity, or “stickiness,” limiting employers’ ability to lower wages in
adverse economic conditions.266 For example, in researching wage bargain-
ing in incomplete contracts, behavioral economists have studied the impact
of “reference dependence,” or employees’ view of their own wages as “fair”
based on what other workers’ wages are within the same job (“horizontal eq-
uity”) or based on their view of what they should be earning relative to oth-
ers in jobs hierarchically above or below them (“vertical equity”).267 They
also study the impacts of “loss aversion,” or workers’ tendency to prefer
avoiding losses to acquiring equivalent gains, which can result in wage
“stickiness.”268 These accounts help explain empirical phenomena—such as
downward wage rigidity, unresponsiveness of incumbents’ wages to labor-
market conditions, cohort effects, noncompetitive wage premia—that con-
found standard economic models that assume profit-maximizing firm con-
duct.269
Industrial/human relations and industrial and organization psychology
(I/O Psychology) adopt an interdisciplinary approach to studying how
workplace norms, management strategies, and employer wage setting impact
worker productivity and firm profitability—all areas critical for understand-
ing the overall gains to trade over which employers and workers bargain and
estimate reservation pricing.270 Industrial relations developed during the
New Deal, bringing together sociology, economics, management, history,
human resource psychology, law, politics, and geography to study the em-
ployment relationship.271 The field primarily divided between personnel
management (studying work from the employer’s perspective—developing
worker productivity and compensation schemes for maximal profit and ef-
fectiveness) and labor relations (studying collective bargaining and work-
force governance from the employees’ perspective).272 Starting in the 1980s,
“personnel management” evolved into Human Resource Management
(HRM), Organizational Behavior (OB), Organizational Development (OD),
266. See, e.g., BEWLEY, supra note 265.
267. See, e.g., Ted O’Donoghue & Charles Sprenger, Reference-Dependent Preferences, in
1 HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS – FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 2 (B. Douglas
Bernheim, Stefano Dellavigna & David Laibson eds., 2018).
268. See, e.g., Alex Dickson & Marco Fongoni, Asymmetric Reference-Dependent Reci-
procity, Downward Wage Rigidity, and the Employment Contract, 163 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
409, 409–10 (2019).
269. Ernst Fehr, Lorenz Goette & Christian Zehnder, The Behavioral Economics of the
Labor Market: Central Findings and Their Policy Implications, in POLICYMAKING INSIGHTS
FROM BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 171, 226–27 (Christopher L. Foote, Lorenz Goette & Stephan
Meier eds., 2009).
270. For industrial relations, see generally UNDERSTANDING WORK AND EMPLOYMENT:
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN TRANSITION (Peter Ackers & Adrian Wilkinson eds., 2003). For I/O
Psychology, see, for example, EDWARD E. LAWLER III & JOHN W. BOUDREAU, HUMAN
RESOURCE EXCELLENCE: ANASSESSMENT OF STRATEGIES AND TRENDS (2018).
271. UNDERSTANDINGWORK AND EMPLOYMENT, supra note 270, at 1–2, 20.
272. Bruce E. Kaufman, Industrial Relations in North America, in UNDERSTANDING
WORK AND EMPLOYMENT, supra note 270, at 195, 196.
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and related human resource fields, while “labor” or “industrial relations” be-
came increasingly associated with only employee-side industrial relations.273
The study of bargaining power in industrial relations was dominated by
institutional labor economists who formulated the NLRB DER’s core ap-
proach and established the intellectual framework for the Clayton Act’s re-
jection of labor commodification.274 The study’s evolved form is primarily
populated by labor economists adopting an interdisciplinary approach to la-
bor-market analysis. Through that interdisciplinary approach, they assess
worker bargaining power; how strike duration impacts wage outcomes; the
impact of workers’ job searches on their bargaining power and wage dynam-
ics; new forms of work organization and the high-performance workplace;
and reform of American labor policy with new forms of employee represen-
tation.275
The HRM and human resource movement, on the other hand, focuses
less on bargaining power and more on worker-output maximization. It stud-
ies management policies that grow the overall pie and manage workers’ ex-
pectations of their share. Drawing from the “Hawthorne experiments” to
improve workers’ efficiency at Western Electric’s Hawthorne Works, HRM
researchers concentrate on “the internal social system in the plant” and
managing employer care “of the psychosocial interactions among workers
and between superiors and subordinates,” viewing unions as hindering
workplace cooperation.276 Scholars and practitioners in growing “Human
Resource” departments at universities and corporations study applied psy-
chology to devise performance measurements, workplace motivation and
reward systems, and the structure of work and organizational development,
all to maximize worker productivity. The HRM literature focuses on reserva-
tion and efficiency wages, or wages that optimize worker productivity within
a firm, rather than the theoretical MRP or competitive wage of IO or struc-
tural labor economics.277
Combined, the insights of behavioralists and industrial/human relations
experts incorporate broader analytic metrics and remedial mechanisms to
273. Id. at 199.
274. Id. at 202–05; Hafiz, supra note 15, at 1119–31.
275. See, e.g., FREEMAN &MEDOFF, supra note 226; Shintaro Yamaguchi, Job Search, Bar-
gaining, and Wage Dynamics, 28 J. LAB. ECON. 595 (2010); Bruce E. Kaufman, The Employee
Participation/Representation Gap, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 491 (2001); David Card & Craig A.
Olson, Bargaining Power, Strike Durations, and Wage Outcomes: An Analysis of Strikes in the
1880s, 13 J. LAB. ECON. 32 (1995).
276. Bruce E. Kaufman, Human Resources and Industrial Relations: Commonalities and
Differences, 11 HUM. RES. MGMT. REV. 339, 352 (2001); see also CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING
TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 43–44 (2003);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J.
1509, 1566–77 (1981).
277. For “efficiency wages,” see, for example, George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, The
Fair-Wage Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment, 105 Q.J. ECON. 255 (1990), and George A.
Akerlof, Gift Exchange and Efficiency-Wage Theory: Four Views, 74 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 79 (1984).
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employer wage-setting power. Where heuristics impact workers’ relative
bargaining power, their research proposes an opt-out union default to equal-
ize bargaining due to unions’ ability to correct behavioral market failures.278
Because unions draw on knowledge of members, negotiators, and elected of-
ficials (“membership” and “expert effect”), as well as the collective experi-
ence of their own and parent organizations (“organizational learning
effect”), they are better able to address the following behavioral market fail-
ures: (1) short-termism (focusing on short-term employment without con-
sidering future events); (2) inattention to important but nonsalient attributes
(like an employer’s hazard identification system or job-evaluation frame-
work); (3) unrealistic optimism (like underpreparation for dismissal for un-
satisfactory performance); and (4) poor probability estimation (like
sufficiently funding pensions to fully finance retirement).279 Unions better
account for employees’ long-term interests because they have a “large and
diverse spectrum of members [within] a range of issues[,] . . . have less rea-
son to be unrealistically optimistic,” and have access to data that gives them
“a better sense of baseline probabilities for future events and issues.”280 Be-
haviorists’ research points to a need for disclosure requirements to reduce
information asymmetries and supports multiemployer or pattern bargaining
to limit employers’ ability to capture rents from behavioral constraints.281
E. Bargaining Power in Macroeconomics
Macroeconomics research documents labor-market concentration’s ef-
fects on labor’s share of national income, modeling and tracking industry-
specific impacts that could guide NLRB policymaking and adjudication on
workers’ relative bargaining power. It predicts and assesses drivers of labor-
market inequality, concentration, and dynamism as well as distributional in-
equality while investigating the impact of those drivers on product-market
concentration, labor’s share of national income, and consumption.282 Under
278. See generally Mark Harcourt, Gregor Gall, Rinu Vimal Kumar & Richard Croucher,
The Role of Unions in Addressing Behavioral Market Failure, ECON & INDUS. DEMOCRACY:
ONLINEFIRST (Jun. 6, 2019) [hereinafter Harcourt et al., The Role of Unions],
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0143831x19853027 [https://perma.cc/AMY9-
Z2SN]; Mark Harcourt, Gregor Gall, Rinu Vimal Kumar & Richard Croucher, A Union De-
fault: A Policy to Raise Union Membership, Promote the Freedom to Associate, Protect the Free-
dom Not to Associate and Progress Union Representation, 48 INDUS. L.J. 66 (2019).
279. Harcourt et al., The Role of Unions, supra note 278, at 2.
280. Id.
281. See Orly Lobel, Knowledge Pays: Reversing Information Flows and the Future of Pay
Equity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 592–96, 603–04 (2020); Andrias, supra note 8, at 79–80; LYNN
RHINEHART & CELINE MCNICHOLAS, ECON. POL’Y INST., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BEYOND
THE WORKSITE 3 n.12 (2020), https://files.epi.org/pdf/193649.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TMT-
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282. See, e.g., PIKETTY, supra note 12; David Berger, Kyle Herkenhoff & Simon Mongey,
Labor Market Power (IZA Inst. of Lab. Econ., IZA DP No. 12276, 2019), http://ftp.iza.org
/dp12276.pdf [https://perma.cc/WC2E-F2YU]; José Azar & Xavier Vives, Oligopoly, Macroe-
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neoclassical macroeconomic theory, the shares of national income earned by
capital and labor are constant and stable.283 But empirical studies show that
labor’s share of national income is declining. Utilizing macroeconomic data
and industry-level variation, economists have devised different theories for
the decline, including decreased union density and the real value of mini-
mum wages.284 Some deploy microeconomic data at the firm and establish-
ment level to evaluate how firm size impacts industry-level and aggregate
labor share.285 Macroeconomic methods and benchmarks for assessing rela-
tive bargaining power include measuring deviations from an equal division
of the capital-labor share of national income; capital concentration within a
national economy; capital costs and prices; and exogenous trade shocks.
Macroeconomists also deploy microeconomic tools to measure industry-
level product-market concentration and sales increases, assessing the fall in
labor’s share based on annual payroll data. For their analytical purposes,
wage rates are less relevant than the share of income going to labor over
capital, and unequal shares indicate unequal bargaining power in an indus-
try or firm.
Macroeconomic evidence also suggests that increased market concentra-
tion leads to declines in employment, output, real wages, the labor share, real
interest rates, and investment levels.286 Administrative agencies outside the
Treasury Department, Federal Reserve, and Congressional Budget Office
have been slow to integrate macroeconomic modeling or analysis into poli-
cymaking and enforcement, and have not yet done so in their enforcement
against employer buyer power, even though recent empirical work suggests
that competition policy and market regulation impact macroeconomic per-
formance.287 Incorporating macroeconomic analysis into labor law could in-
conomic Performance, and Competition Policy, IESE BLOG NETWORK (Dec. 18, 2018),
https://blog.iese.edu/xvives/files/2018/12/Azar-Vives-Dec-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6VH-
4QKM]; David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson & John Van Reenen,
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No. 10756, 2017), http://ftp.iza.org/dp10756.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LPZ-DMWQ]; Lijun Zhu,
Industrial Concentration and the Declining Labor Share, WASH. U. (Nov. 10, 2017), https://cpb-
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(D.C. Hague ed., 1986).
284. See, e.g., Berger et al., supra note 282; Michael W.L. Elsby, Bart Hobjin & Ayşegül
Şahin, The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2013,
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form policymakers on how to gear policies toward economic growth by re-
ducing employer buyer power.288
F. Equal Bargaining Power: Coherence and Administrability
Each approach outlined here has developed theoretical frameworks,
methodological techniques, and empirical data and analyses that give real
substance to the problem of identifying and correcting for unequal bargain-
ing power. And each brings unique methods and analyses of the processes
and strategies that impact parties’ relative bargaining strength. Thus, in tak-
ing the NLRA’s purposes seriously, the Board would ideally benefit from in-
terdisciplinary expertise, cross-pollination, and consensus building within an
internal research division that would advise its rulemaking and adjudication
on the question of relative bargaining power impacts.289 Interdisciplinary
collaboration exists in a number of agencies, including the CFPB and the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Economic and Risk Analy-
sis, and would allow the NLRB to bring significantly more expertise to its
labor regulation than it currently can given its lack of internal social scien-
tific infrastructure.290 Thus, a congressional repeal of its ban on hiring social
scientists and establishment of a new internal social science division within
the NLRB would be ideal for analyzing the determinants and existence of
unequal bargaining power. But even absent congressional intervention, the
Board can do a considerable amount under its existing investigative powers,
developing detailed records in adjudications based on parties’ information,
amicus briefing, and notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. Further, through Memoranda of Understanding
(MOUs), the Board could, like the majority of agencies, collect information
from other agencies on employers as well as industry-specific labor-market
conditions. It could then organize this data within a network of “systemic
facts” that inform its decisionmaking.291 Thus, while in-house expertise is
optimal, considerable data is available through government sources and aca-
demic research sharable with the Board in aid of its bargaining power de-
terminations.
The challenges to integrating social scientific methods and research into
an administrable equal bargaining power standard are determining how to
weigh competing evidence; resolve conflicting approaches to bargaining
power-analysis under its external, transactional, internal, and distributional
variants; and decide what the correct balance of power is. But while the vari-
288. Azar & Vives, supra note 282, at 23–28.
289. See Hafiz, supra note 15, at 1179–83 (proposing new Division of Economic Re-
search).
290. For overview of agencies’ research divisions, see id. at 1143–52. For repeal, see supra
note 58 and accompanying text.
291. For “systemic facts,” see Crespo, supra note 58. For interagency coordination on
labor-market regulation, see Hiba Hafiz, Labor Justice System (2020) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with theMichigan Law Review).
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ous fields may be in tension with one another in certain respects discussed
here, their approaches and empirical analyses can be deployed to approxi-
mate answers to one fundamental question: Will the legal rule at issue most
closely mimic a bargaining process such that labor and management, going
into bargaining negotiations, would be able to hold out indefinitely? An-
swers will require weighing competing views on the facts and data analysis
and will necessarily be an evolutionary enterprise that will gain in sophistica-
tion over time.
For example, the Board would need to look beyond traditional IO ap-
proaches applied in antitrust law to ascertain employer monopsony because
those approaches are exclusively concerned with market power that bench-
marks ideal “competitive” wages at workers’ MRP.292 Antitrust policy and
remedies are not concerned with a broad range of labor-market failures—
search frictions, information asymmetries, and heterogeneous preferences—
which labor economists identify as accruing to employers’ buyer power,
“even in large, non-concentrated labor markets with many employers.”293
Where labor economists identify such market failures and antitrust law is
not tasked with correcting them, labor law must intervene or let the ensuing
social harms go uncorrected. And there is a growing consensus by labor anti-
trust scholars that while “antitrust enforcement . . . should be strengthened,”
“stronger and more tailored policy instruments are needed to make signifi-
cant progress on the problem of labor monopsony,” including through the
labor law.294 Thus, labor law must adopt a broader understanding of em-
ployer buyer power beyond strict IO accounts. Employer buyer power under
labor law must broadly include a more general “capacity to force lower pric-
es from” workers: “These lower prices can be reduced below the market rate
(as in classic monopsony); exacted out of an unequal distribution of relation-
ship-specific surplus (as in transaction cost accounts); or arise from lowering
inflated prices to a market rate.”295
Additionally, standard IO models begin with an assumption of a ho-
mogenous goods market. This assumption is useful for basic market-power
analyses but would be a tenuous foundation for broader labor regulatory
policy because labor markets are replete with differentiated skills complexity,
productivity rates, and difficult-to-measure individual contributions to par-
ticipatory and team-based workplaces. And measuring employers’ market
share is difficult when workers choose between firm employment, shared
employment, and self-employment, each demanding slightly different skills
provision, risks, and opportunities. Further, calculating broader, nonwage
anticompetitive harms of employer monopsony and collusion, like increased
shirking, decreased or slowed innovation, and a reduction in the variety of
292. See infra notes 306–307 and accompanying text.
293. See Naidu & Posner, supra note 9, at 8.
294. Id.
295. Wilmers, supra note 137, at 239 n.2.
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services, could benefit from behavioral and industrial-relations analyses.296
The significant empirical findings of labor-market monopsony generated by
IO have either bracketed these concerns or simplified their models; a broad-
er, interdisciplinary approach to labor markets is required.297
Thus, solely relying on IO or structural labor economics’ “external” as-
sessments of employer market power is insufficient. It is necessary to assess
“internal” bargaining power determinations inside the firm and broader de-
terminants of wage setting to more accurately determine relative bargaining
power. Industrial-relations experts are crucial for this endeavor because they
incorporate analysis of equity and fairness within individual workplaces and
across industries on wage bargaining (whether those be market-clearing
wages, internal labor-market wages, union premium wages, or other com-
pensation measures).298 Non-IO approaches also view wage determination as
a process that prices in labor productivity as a dynamic input of produc-
tion—not only in terms of the variable productivity of workers within their
life cycle (internal labor-market wages) but also in incentivizing productivity
through “fairness” and discounting wage “stickiness.”299 This is a particularly
important dimension to any bargaining-power analysis because output-
maximizing wages increase the size of the pie that determines the wage-
bargaining window. While some identify the MRP wage (or its proxies) as
the output-maximizing wage,300 using the MRP as the proper benchmark for
the wage at which workers maximize output may be underinclusive within
the broader social science literature. For example, behavioral economists and
organizational psychologists might describe a particular employee’s produc-
tivity-maximizing wage as the wage slightly below that employee’s supervisor
but above an employee they supervise, like an assistant, because the employ-
ee may shirk—or be less productive—at a lower wage. That wage may or
may not correspond with the MRP. And exclusive reliance on economic ra-
ther than broader sociological, psychological, and industrial-relations ap-
proaches to fairness limits our understanding of workers’ true valuation of
the costs of holding out.
Nor do IO and more conventional labor economics focus on the impact
and health of labor-market institutions in preempting or remedying bargain-
296. For nonprice monopsony power costs, see C. Scott Hemphill & Nancy L. Rose,Mer-
gers that Harm Sellers, 127 YALE L.J. 2078, 2083 (2018).
297. See supra notes 9, 229.
298. See, e.g., WEIL, supra note 19, at 81–83 (summarizing literature); BEWLEY, supra
note 265, at 81 (explaining pay equity fairness); PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE,
INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS (1971); Arindrajit Dube, Laura Giuli-
ano & Jonathan Leonard, Fairness and Frictions: The Impact of Unequal Raises on Quit Behav-
ior, 109 AM. ECON. REV. 620 (2019); Christine Jolls, Fairness, Minimum Wage Law, and
Employee Benefits, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 47 (2002); Mark G. Kelman, Progressive Vacuums, 48
STAN. L. REV. 975 (1996) (book review); Kahneman et al., supra note 265, at 739–40 (finding
fairness rules apply to wage setting).
299. See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 298; Kahneman et al., supra note 265, at 739–40.
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ing-power imbalances. The impact of these institutions on static wage setting
and broader, dynamic negotiations on work rules, life-cycle earnings, and
countercyclical pricing games must be at the core of any structural regulato-
ry approach to wage policy targeting macroeconomic effects.301 Many as-
pects of employers’ leverage over workers’ wages and working conditions
extend beyond wage setting into aspects of day-to-day control, scheduling,
right to organize without retaliation, and other forms of deleveraging power
primarily regulated under labor and employment law. This lived experience
of workplace control is the framework within which employer coercion is
exercised and workplace decisionmaking occurs,302 but it is also the frame-
work within which bargaining leverage accumulates.303 IO and traditional
labor-economics approaches neither assess nor monitor these effects on
wage bargains.
In addition, neither is well-suited for assessing and servicing “distribu-
tional” bargaining power accounts or regulating employer buyer-power ef-
fects as unequal gains from the employment bargain. Nor are they concerned
with monopsonistic externalities that can create or entrench buyer power
that is “harder . . . to deal with [than seller power] because of the dispersed
nature of its impact.”304 For example, employers routinely transfer the costs
of deadweight loss, infracompetitive wages, and limited-if-any job benefits to
the government, and policing the spread of these externalities in the “fis-
sured” workplace is challenging.305 Utilizing macroeconomic analysis to
identify and adjust for the pernicious effects of employer buyer power on la-
bor’s share must critically be the purview of labor law as it fulfills the NLRA’s
equal bargaining power and macroeconomic goals.306 And doing so would
allow the NLRB to calibrate its regulation of employer buyer power with
broader macroeconomic regulation that occurs in other agencies.
But how should the Board and the courts consolidate and evaluate com-
peting estimations of employer bargaining power and benchmarks on wage
suppression? An IO economist may view the MRP as the proper “competi-
tive wage rate” that captures the “right” amount of bargaining power at per-
fect competition. An industrial-relations expert or labor economist may view
a higher wage—a union premium or internal labor-market wage—as the
301. See, e.g., Benmelech et al., supra note 11.
302. SeeMichael M. Oswalt, The Content of Coercion, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1585 (2019).
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POWER 9 (2017).
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most appropriate division of the gains of trade because it is the output-
maximizing wage that increases most the size of the pie. A macroeconomist
may view an unequal division of profits between labor and capital as indica-
tive of unequal bargaining power.307 Which estimation or benchmark should
govern their NLRA analysis if they conflict?
As the next Part discusses, the Board and the courts can tether evidence-
based equal bargaining power judgments to the broader micro- and macroe-
conomic purposes of national labor policy. These purposes include “stabi-
liz[ing] . . . competitive wage rates and working conditions within and
between industries” and preventing depression of wage earners’ “purchasing
power.”308 More specifically, the Board and the courts can synthesize and
streamline disparate analyses into categorical rules based on their emerging
understanding of parties’ respective holdout ability after reviewing the totali-
ty of the administrative record in specific cases and industries. For example,
the Board could establish—through rulemaking or adjudication—a default
rule that wage setting below the MRP or a macroeconomic determination
that labor’s share of income relative to capital in a particular industry pre-
sents a rebuttable presumption of a bargaining-power imbalance. Additional
evidence of market failures or coercion that accrues to employers could also
indicate unequal bargaining power. Or, the Board might determine that evi-
dence of an employer’s historical record of labor and employment law viola-
tions, ease in replacing striking workers, contractual agreements and
resources to ride out strikes, or aggressive use of its property rights to limit
strike effectiveness creates a bargaining power imbalance.309 The Board’s
judgment here will not be as predictable as a strict rule, much like most
agency or court judgments requiring evaluation of social scientific evidence
under broad legal standards. But it will be based on data and analysis that far
exceed the reliability and accuracy of assessments of evidence under already
broad current standards, which rely on no information about bargaining-
power impact. And bargaining-power analysis will require regulators to pro-
vide strong justifications for burdens they places on workers’ right to coun-
ter employers’ buyer power.310
A second challenge to incorporating social science is that it is not im-
mune from political malleability. 311 How could we guarantee that the Board
307. See, e.g., Benjamin Bental & Dominique Demougin, Declining Labor Shares and
Bargaining Power: An Institutional Explanation, 32 J. MACROECONOMICS 443 (2010).
308. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151.
309. For calibrating employers’ property rights during strikes, see Hiba Hafiz, Ownership
Work and Work Ownership, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/03/30/ownership-work-and-work-ownership-by-
hiba-hafiz/ [https://perma.cc/ZNK6-7QA5].
310. See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., DAVID KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE: HOW POWER, LAW, AND
EXPERTISE SHAPE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2016); SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE
BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (1995); Elliott Ash, Daniel L. Chen &
Suresh Naidu, Ideas Have Consequences: The Impact of Law and Economics on American Jus-
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and the courts’ legal judgments and fact finding are not ideologically based
or biased? The Board’s history of politicizing rulings—flip-flopping between
Democratic and Republican administrations—provides reason for concern
that integrating social scientific analysis will be manipulated to favor overde-
termined results.312 Trump Administration attempts to shape regulation by
limiting or cherry-picking scientific evidence agencies rely on are foreboding
for the proposition that evidence-based approaches informed by social sci-
ence can overcome ideologically driven outcomes.313 And in its most recent
rulemakings, the Board has ignored comments that highlight and expose so-
cial scientific critiques of its proposed rules, so even where social scientific
evidence is offered to refine rules, it has demonstrated a willingness to ignore
it.314
However, Board and court decisions that rely on “relevant social science
and empirical data” promise more transparency by “expressly articulat[ing]
the grounds for factual assertions and, as a result, more clearly reflect the in-
terpretive choices involved” in labor law decisionmaking.315 Requiring agen-
cies to develop a social scientific and evidentiary record has been a primary
means for courts to hold agencies’ feet to the fire, ensuring that they meet
their procedural and substantive burdens in justifying policies.316 So reintro-
ducing social scientific analysis can create a new stage of contestation for
parties and the public based on more thoroughly studied proxies of employ-
tice, SSRN (Mar. 20, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2992782
[https://perma.cc/W88P-X94G]; Daniel Hirschman & Elizabeth Popp Berman, Do Economists
Make Policies? On the Political Effects of Economics, 12 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 779 (2014); Duncan
Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVEDICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
312. On flip-flopping, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., Lisa Friedman, E.P.A. to Limit Science Used to Write Public Health Rules,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/11/climate/epa-science-
trump.html [https://perma.cc/4BZY-GG5D]; Kayla Epstein, Andrew Freedman, Jason
Samenow & Kate Harrison Belz, NOAA’s Chief Scientist Will Investigate Why Agency Backed
Trump over Experts, Email Shows, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2019/09/09/noaas-chief-scientist-will-investigate-
why-agency-backed-trump-over-its-experts-dorian-email-shows/ (on file with the Michigan
Law Review).
314. Compare Hiba Hafiz, Brishen Rogers, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Kate Bron-
fenbrenner, Comment Letter on the National Labor Relations Board’s Proposed Joint-
Employer Rule (Jan. 14, 2019), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp/1201/
[https://perma.cc/KY7P-X9MR] (criticizing a proposed rule by showing that indirect employ-
ers exploit labor-market power with, for instance, noncompetes), with Joint Employer Status
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 C.F.R. 103 (2020) (responding to that criticism in
only a sentence, saying that the current definition of joint employers can accommodate the
Comment’s concerns).
315. Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword, Transparent Adjudication and
Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
733, 735 (2000). I thank Ben Levin for alerting me to this research and its insights.
316. See, e.g., Hafiz, supra note 15, at 1139; Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Cost-Benefit
Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (2018).
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er control. It can enhance visibility of the ideological assumptions informing
Board reasoning, making it easier for the public to know the bases of its deci-
sions and strategize on challenging them. Further, a growing administrative
law literature has documented the tempering ability of civil-service protect-
ed-career officials with expertise on ideological swings generated by political
appointees.317 Evidence-based reasoning can ensure political accountability
by constraining agencies from straying from Congress’s delegating statute.318
And stronger, evidence-based results could strengthen the Board’s posi-
tion on judicial review under doctrines of deference, shielding it from judi-
cial dilution of labor law.319 As this Article has argued, eighty years of labor
adjudication in the vacuum of the NLRB’s original institutional alignment in
interdisciplinary social science has enabled a judicial formalism that “deradi-
calized” the NLRA’s original potency and dispersed and misaligned workers’
collective rights.320 Renewed institutional alignment of Board expertise and
the NLRA’s equal bargaining power purpose may enable and sustain a body
of expertise and deliberative processes that slow political vacillations.
A third challenge to incorporating social science is that critics of equal-
bargaining analysis have argued that unequal bargaining power doctrine is
either “internally incoherent” or would “not capture the moral problem
raised by inequality” in employment relationships.321 Specifically, Duncan
Kennedy has argued, primarily in reference to contract law, that unequal
bargaining power doctrine falsely presumes a hypothetical state of affairs
where the law has not already shaped the conditions for the possibility of
bargaining outcomes. It then seeks to “equalize” bargaining power through
judicial imposition of compulsory contract terms that rely on common law
judges’ contingent conceptions of voluntariness and freedom in ways that
are manipulable, underdetermined, and internally contradictory within the
common law canon.322 An aligned critique that equal bargaining power
317. See, e.g., ALANM. JACOBS, GOVERNING FOR THE LONG TERM: DEMOCRACY AND THE
POLITICS OF INVESTMENT 28–30 (2011); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Po-
litical Transitions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 471, 526 (2011) (viewing stability as corollary to exper-
tise); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89
TEX. L. REV. 15, 24 (2010). Scholars have also catalogued how federal bureaucracy can check
presidential overreach through “bureaucratic resistance from below.” Jennifer Nou, Bureau-
cratic Resistance from Below, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. 16, 2016),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/bureaucratic-resistance-from-below-by-jennifer-nou/ [https://
perma.cc/D9EP-YVH7]; see, e.g., ROSEMARY O’LEARY, THE ETHICS OF DISSENT: MANAGING
GUERILLA GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 2014); JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING,
AND SABOTAGE (1999); Jennifer Nou, Civil Servant Disobedience, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349
(2019); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the
Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (2016); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian
Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032 (2011).
318. See, e.g., Edward Stiglitz, Delegating for Trust, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2018).
319. See supra note 23.
320. Klare, supra note 18.
321. Kennedy, supra note 216, at 623; Bagchi, supra note 94, at 580.
322. See Kennedy, supra note 216, at 578–82.
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analysis is underdetermined is that by Aditi Bagchi, who emphasizes how
such analysis ignores the critical moral dimensions that elicit our view that
such inequality is “unfair” or “unjust”: “By attributing unappealing outcomes
directly, or ultimately, to bargaining power inequality, we obscure the justice
or injustice, i.e., the moral properties, of background institutions.”323
But social scientific research and analysis can subject such background
rules to their analysis as opposed to taking those rules as given, or at the very
least reveal them as contributing to determinations of how rights have been
allocated and establish the parameters of a richer debate on normative ques-
tions. What this Article has attempted to highlight are the vast efforts of
these social scientists to use theoretical and empirical tools to put meat on
the bones of the world as Kennedy and Bagchi see it. Social scientists have
sought to give substance and contours to precisely how background rules are
or are not incorporated into the framework of unequal bargaining power
analysis and delineating the ways that legal and social institutions, market
forces, and labor-market actors’ conduct and beliefs enhance or deflate the
power of actors in those markets. Social scientists have also devised strate-
gies, models, and empirical analyses to ascertain what conduct and structural
remedies might improve the state of play to combat substantive and proce-
dural inequality, the adverse impacts of employer buyer power on workers,
and the ossification of current distributions that predetermine certain out-
comes over others absent intervention. Additionally, the interdisciplinary
approach described here is one that very explicitly seeks to incorporate fair-
ness considerations in the bargaining-power analysis, at least as fairness is
understood subjectively by workers and employers through behavioral theo-
ry, organizational psychology, and other industrial-relations approaches. But
it also plainly seeks to introduce the distributive dimension of fairness by
applying the tools of bargaining and macroeconomic theory to directly eval-
uate both surplus distribution and the parties’ perceptions of fairness in that
distribution. And introducing these approaches into legal reasoning can bet-
ter shape precedent than the alternatives because it would populate the rec-
ord with facts, data, and interpretation that can shape and reshape our
understanding of the realities of power formation. This could bring us closer
to Kennedy’s ideal of “knowing others, rather than just making rules for
them.”324
Finally, Board-led social scientific analysis of bargaining power is a pub-
lic good in its own right. Ignoring social science has isolated the Board from
the rigor of competing empirical understandings of how labor markets work
as well as theoretical and empirical formulations of employer power. Ena-
bling Board integration of interdisciplinary study into regulatory debates
about which modeling and data are most relevant for executing and tailoring
policy goals would further these understandings.325 The benefits of more
323. Bagchi, supra note 94, at 595.
324. Kennedy, supra note 216, at 649.
325. SeeHafiz, supra note 15, at 1130 & n.70.
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Board-led research, data collection, and labor-market analysis would provide
a significant service to the public, policymakers, labor market-regulating
agencies, and independent researchers.
III. EQUAL BARGAINING POWER AND STRUCTURAL LABOR RIGHTS
To fulfill the NLRA’s enduring equal bargaining power purpose, the
Board can draw on the wealth of social scientific developments to reform
doctrine in key areas that impact bargaining power most: the scope of its ju-
risdiction (who counts as covered “employees” and “employers”); the scope
of workers’ section 7 rights; and the scope of employer and union ULPs. Do-
ing so will aid in achieving the normative values at the Act’s core, namely,
reducing inefficiencies and promoting distributional fairness to overcome
labor-market failures.326 But it will also service the Act’s other goal of labor
peace by creating optimal conditions for quick labor-dispute resolution.327
Drawing from social scientific developments, the Board should consider
the sources of each party’s relative bargaining power and outside options as
well as broader industry-specific data it collects through adjudication and
rulemaking.328 In considering the sources of workers’ bargaining power, the
Board should examine the power workers attain due to existing protections
under labor and employment law and how those protections might be un-
dermined by other law—antitrust law, property law, social insurance, and
other legal frameworks. For example, the Board might assess the impact of
minimum wage laws as setting a wage floor and the extent and scope of gov-
ernment interventions to protect worker organizing, collective bargaining,
and strikes on worker bargaining power. However, the Board might weigh
that against other statutory provisions and doctrine that weaken worker bar-
gaining power, like weaker minimum wage laws, legal bans on secondary
boycotts, limited unemployment benefits, and other social safety nets that
increase the risks of termination and employer retaliation. Other legal
frameworks that might weaken worker bargaining power might be antitrust
law and policy that prohibit worker combinations (depending on the scope
of the labor exemptions), limitations on access to collective forms of legal
action (whether through class action, collective action, or collective arbitra-
tion mechanisms), and limitations on First Amendment protections for ac-
cessing work sites and engaging in expressive activity on employer property.
Other sources of worker bargaining power are economic: labor input-, in-
dustry-, and skill-specific scarcity; labor-market demand, industry- or skill-
specific demand by employers, and availability of alternative employment;
job guarantees or public-option employment; the nature of the industry
(production of perishable goods or time-sensitive production cycles); and
union strike funds, worker savings, liquid assets, and access to credit. Fur-
326. See 29 U.S.C. § 151.
327. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
328. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 161 (investigative authority); id. § 156 (rulemaking authority).
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ther, certain labor markets might be more prone to market failures than oth-
ers, and those market failures might accrue to the benefit of workers’ or em-
ployers’ bargaining power. For example, if there are high search costs in a
particular labor market, or if there are lock-in effects that keep workers in
jobs even when they are being paid below their MRP (whether because of
heterogeneous preferences, nonportable benefits, nonportable firm-specific
skills and training, the accumulation of human capital and trade secrets, or
other reasons), that weakens worker bargaining power. Information asym-
metries—for example, privately held information about union or strike sup-
port, membership rates, and the likelihood of employer devaluation of firm-
specific capital—would also impact the bargaining power of workers relative
to their employers. Additional sources of workers’ bargaining power might
include their ability to pressure employers through (in a nonexhaustive list)
high union density within the industry; establishing “closed shops,” union
hiring halls, and other agreements; existing relationships and solidarity with
other unions or workers; high-level organizing skills and outreach to existing
and potential union members; robust relationships with political actors; and
consumer boycotts, public-relations pressures, community relations, reputa-
tional costs of antiunion campaigns, and union labels.329
On the other hand, the Board should consider a range of sources of em-
ployers’ bargaining power in its equal bargaining power analysis, and the fol-
lowing discussion is nonexhaustive. As with workers, employers gain
bargaining power from existing legal protections and privileges, whether
through legal defaults (like at-will employment); government intervention in
organizing, collective bargaining, and strikes under labor and employment
law (including protections for lock-outs, worker replacement, adjudicatory
delays, availability of injunctive relief and remedies, and exemptions); em-
ployer property rights and control of the means of production; or First
Amendment protections to engage in antiunion speech, limit government
notification to workers of their rights, or limit workers’ expressive activity.330
Employers might also be able to rely on legal background rules and other
government grants to increase their bargaining power over workers, like the
ability to externalize costs of a healthy and productive workforce by relying
on a government-provided safety net; access to government industry- or
firm-specific subsidies; and transition costs to outsourcing, subcontracting,
plant relocation, and offshoring under labor and employment, corporate,
tax, and trade law. Employers’ bargaining power might also be sourced in the
economic conditions of labor markets from which they draw, whether due to
their own conduct (acquiring and maintaining monopsony power, colluding
with other employers to gain buyer power, merging to increase their market
power) or due to natural labor-market frictions that favor them (search
costs, heterogeneous preferences, worker mobility costs, lock-in effects, in-
329. See, e.g., REES, supra note 228.
330. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 305, 341–43 (1994); Hafiz, supra note 309.
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formation asymmetries). Legal background rules also matter here: the ease
with which employers might collude, merge, or allow common ownership
under the antitrust laws impacts their relative bargaining power over work-
ers. Further, existing labor-market and product-market conditions impact
employers’ bargaining leverage, so the Board should consider the level of
competition in the labor supply for a “reserve army”; the availability of au-
tomation or worker substitutes; the employers’ market power in product
markets allowing them to reduce labor inputs; and durable consumer loyalty.
Employers’ ability to hold out during strikes and other activity gives them
bargaining power, so the Board should review employer liquidity, credit ac-
cess, and access to capital; contracts with suppliers, distributors, franchisors,
and others that enable riding out strikes; enforceable profit-sharing agree-
ments between employers during strikes; and other robust contingency
planning. Finally, the Board might consider employers’ marketing skills and
resources, relationships with political actors and lobbying history, and other
sources of support that could buttress their ability to withstand economic
pressure from their workers.
The Subsections below offer new standards for defining and interpreting
the NLRA’s core provisions within an equal bargaining power framework
and demonstrate how that framework is both administrable and normatively
desirable. The Subsections are premised on the principle, in applying this
new framework, that the Board (and the courts) will regulate the bargaining
process, not the substantive terms of the bargain itself.331 Thus, the approach
is on the regulation side of the regulation/rate-setting or price-control spec-
trum. While the Board could look to prior bargains and current wage offers
as evidence of the parties’ bargaining positions, that evidence would be one
among many indicators of where the parties stand relative to each other.
A. Equal Bargaining Power Analysis of “Employer” and “Employee” Status
The NLRB should use social scientific analysis in ascertaining its juris-
diction over “employers” and “employees” through its equal bargaining
power purpose, whether through adjudication or rulemaking. It should en-
sure that status determinations align with guaranteeing workers’ counter-
vailing power against employers. More specifically, “employees” should be
defined to include all those providing labor inputs that face buyer power, di-
rect or indirect, by a purchasing firm, and the NLRB should likewise define
“employer” or “joint employer” to include all those with buyer power, direct
or indirect, over workers’ labor inputs.332 A buyer-power test is consistent
with the Board’s common law “right to control” test because it directly
demonstrates the employer’s power to “control . . . the details of the work” as
a wage setter rather than a wage taker, and monopsony control of workers’
331. See supra notes 188–193 and accompanying text.
332. SeeHafiz, supra note 15, at 1159.
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outside options directly bears on whether workers have “significant entre-
preneurial opportunity for gain or loss.”333
The Board currently adopts a narrow view of “employee” and “employ-
er.” In defining “employee,” the Trump Board views each common law
agency test factor “through the prism of entrepreneurial opportunity,” in-
cluding the extent of employer control; the nature of the occupation and skill
required; the length of employment; the method of payment; the parties’ be-
liefs in creating a master-servant relationship; and whether the principal is a
business, the worker is engaged in a distinct occupation from that regular
business, and the worker supplies material.334 As for joint employers, the
Trump Board has implemented a more demanding standard through rule-
making, requiring that putative joint employers “possess and exercise such
substantial direct and immediate control over one or more essential terms or
conditions of their employment.”335 The rule overrides an Obama Board rul-
ing extending “joint-employer” status to those that “share or codeter-
mine . . . essential terms and conditions of employment” with direct
employers; “control exercised indirectly—such as through an intermediary”
was enough.336
Neither definition considers how withdrawal of Board jurisdiction to a
smaller number of “employers” and “employees” in a fissured and highly
nonunion workforce impacts relative bargaining power, nor do they accord
common law agency requirements with the NLRA’s equal bargaining power
purpose.337 But they could easily do so, and in fact, California and various
state courts have adopted alternative tests “that give[] full weight to the im-
portance of counteracting employer power.”338
The Board could begin by incorporating firm- and industry-specific in-
formation about external, transactional, internal, and distributional bargain-
ing power. It could assess labor’s share of income relative to capital- and IO-
based indicators of employer power as supplemented by labor, industrial-
333. Supershuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, slip op. at 1–2 (Jan. 25, 2019); 1
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220, 220 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1958); see, e.g., NLRB v.
United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968). In the alternative, as I argue elsewhere, Con-
gress could amend the NLRA to align status determinations with employers’ monopsony pow-
er. SeeHafiz, supra note 15.
334. Supershuttle, slip op. at 1–2, 9–15; Memorandum from Jayme L. Sophir, Assoc. Gen.
Couns., N.L.R.B. to Jill Coffman, Reg’l Dir., Region 20 (Apr. 16, 2019) (on file with the Michi-
gan Law Review).
335. Joint Employer Status Under the National Labor Relations Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 11,184,
11,235 (Feb. 26, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103).
336. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, slip op. at 2 (Aug. 27,
2015) (quoting NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d. Cir.
1982)).
337. See Bagenstos, supra note 184, at 32 (arguing courts’ “employer” and “employee”
interpretations “undermine efforts to rectify imbalances in bargaining power”).
338. Id. at 37–40 (citing Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1 (Cal.
2018), and Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, L.L.C., 106 A.3d 449 (N.J. 2015)); see also CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 2750.3 (West 2020).
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relations, and behavioral experts that better map employer/employee
BATNAs. “Employee” and “employer” status would be centered on analyz-
ing whether higher buyer power or bargaining leverage by employers would
be balanced by countervailing power on the part of a broader definition of
“employees.” A worker would be deemed an “employee” if the purported
employer has buyer power to force lower compensation for labor inputs.
Likewise, a labor-inputs purchaser would be deemed an “employer” or “joint
employer” if it can so force such lower compensation. In highly concentrated
labor markets, the Board should infer, just as antitrust agencies do, that firms
are highly susceptible to “coordinated interaction” and thus have sufficient
oligopsony power over wages to count as “joint employers” under the
NLRA.339 The Board’s data and analysis could be acquired through solicita-
tion, information sharing with other agencies, analysis of existing empirical
studies, and/or analysis generated through a new internal division.
Two examples that dominate “employee” and “joint employer” status
discussions are rideshare drivers and franchisor employers, respectively. The
equal bargaining power test could be applied to both consistent with existing
precedent. As for rideshare drivers, the Board could evaluate “employee” sta-
tus based on the above models and data under the common law agency
test.340 First, to assess a rideshare company’s buyer power, the Board could
evaluate existing theoretical and empirical studies, supplementing them with
its data collection from rideshare companies in existing adjudications.341
While an IO or structural-labor-economics analysis can serve as a baseline,
broader social scientific evidence indicative of unequal bargaining power is
relevant. The company’s buyer power is direct evidence of its ability to con-
trol wages and the scope of drivers’ entrepreneurial opportunity: a driver’s
“opportunity [to] gain or los[e]”342 or “independence to pursue economic
gain”343 toward individual business development is impaired where her
compensation is artificially suppressed. Further, buyer power just is the
339. For “coordinated interaction,” see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 7.1 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr
/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/N45B-VYUH]. See also United States v.
Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Elders Grain, 868 F.2d 901, 905
(7th Cir. 1989).
340. The discussion assumes application of the Board’s current test, but the same analysis
could apply under its prior decision in FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55 (Sept. 30,
2014).
341. For current adjudications, see, for example, Gonzalez v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No.
3:17-cv-02264 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 24, 2017), and Meyer v. Kalanick, No. 1:15-cv-9796
(S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 16, 2015). For Uber’s monopsony, see Marshall Steinbaum, Monopsony
and the Business Model of Gig Economy Platforms, OECD (Jun. 5, 2019),
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2019)66/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/2JXP-
69R6]; Dube et al., Monopsony in Online Labor Markets, supra note 9; Seth Harris, Workers,
Protections, and Benefits in the U.S. Gig Economy, 2018 GLOBAL L. REV. 7 (2018).
342. Supershuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, slip op. at 2 (Jan. 25, 2019).
343. Id. at 9 (“[I]n general, the more control, the less scope for entrepreneurial initiative,
and vice versa.”).
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power to reduce labor inputs, so a rideshare company’s profitable, unilateral
reduction of the number of drivers servicing routes can be evidence of buyer
power. Here, for example, Uber’s buyer power is evidenced by its require-
ment of drivers’ blind acceptance of passengers without knowing ride profit-
ability; default setting of artificially low minimum fares; unilateral ability to
deactivate drivers; mandated reverse rebates to lock in drivers against other
apps; and “design decisions and information asymmetries . . . to effect a ‘soft
control’ over workers’ routines.”344 Additionally, information asymmetries
generated by Uber’s collection and retention of extensive monitoring data
and information on driver performance while limiting drivers’ knowledge of
“referent wages” of Uber’s internally employed workers would be relevant.345
As with “independent-contractor” status, the question of franchisor-
franchisee “joint-employer” status is highly scrutinized, particularly in the
fast-food industry.346 But status determination could greatly benefit from
bargaining-power analysis. Under an equal bargaining power framework,
the Board would extend “employer” status to franchisors with buyer power
over franchisees if it is in the franchisors’ discretion to unilaterally limit ei-
ther franchisee employee compensation or franchisees’ labor-cost flexibility
through product-market restraints. To assess a franchisor’s buyer power, the
Board could draw on existing academic studies, generate its own studies, and
take notice of filings in existing judicial or administrative records. For exam-
ple, the Board could review evidence of a bargaining power imbalance be-
tween franchisee employees and lead company franchisors from their
respective income shares .347 It could draw on empirical studies finding that
lead companies have buyer power over outsourced or franchisee entities and
their employees and that fissuring enables them to wage discriminate.348 The
Board and the Department of Labor have brought a series of enforcement
actions against McDonald’s and other franchisors, offering access to details
of their franchising agreements’ vertical restraints limiting franchisee control
of labor-cost flexibility and information about actual pricing and labor
344. LAWRENCE MISHEL, ECON. POL’Y INST., UBER DRIVERS ARE NOT ENTREPRENEURS:
NLRB GENERAL COUNSEL IGNORES THE REALITIES OF DRIVING FOR UBER (2019), https://www
.epi.org/files/pdf/176202.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC4T-G6R2]; Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark,
Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries, 10 INT’L J. COMMC’N 3758, 3760–76 (2016).
345. See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 298, at 65–66.
346. See, e.g., WEIL, supra note 19, at 122–58.
347. See Autor et al., supra note 282, at 26.
348. For fissuring and wage penalties, see WEIL, supra note 19, at 88–91; Arindrajit Dube
& Ethan Kaplan, Does Outsourcing Reduce Wages in Low-Wage Service Occupations?, 63
INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 287 (2010); Matthew Dey, Susan Houseman & Anne Polivka, What
Do We Know About Contracting Out in the United States?, in LABOR IN THE NEW ECONOMY
267 (Katharine G. Abraham, James R. Spletzer & Michael J. Harper eds., 2010). For monopso-
ny in franchising, see WEIL, supra note 19, at 122–58; Callaci, supra note 33; MinWoong Ji &
David Weil, Does Ownership Structure Influence Regulatory Behavior? (Bos. Univ. Sch. of
Mgmt. Rsch. Paper Series, No. 2010-21, 2009); Annette Bernhardt, Michael W. Spiller & Nik
Theodore, Employers Gone Rogue: Explaining Industry Variation in Violations of Workplace
Laws, 66 ILR REV. 808 (2013).
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costs.349 The Board could evaluate additional labor-market restraints that
limit workers’ bargaining power, including use of no-poaching and non-
compete provisions in franchising contracts.350 Because noncompetes result
in externalities that impact compensation and performance at other and fu-
ture employers, it is critical the Board take their impacts seriously in evaluat-
ing workers’ relative bargaining power.351 Further, the Board could compare
wage rates for franchisors’ direct employees with franchisees’ direct employ-
ees within the same geographic labor market to identify wage penalties in-
dicative of buyer power and franchisor rents.352 Additional data points could
include franchisors’ excessive royalty charges and other fees profitably im-
posed on franchisees. It could also include franchisors’ reliance on spillovers
or government subsidies to keep workers productive, including evidence of
the social costs of fast-food franchising on taxpayer-funded safety-net pro-
grams.353
Extending the Board’s jurisdiction is the best way to internalize external-
ities created by employer buyer power. Jurisdictional expansion will facilitate
and ensure more populated and expansive labor-market institutions that can
curtail the rise of that power in the first instance.354 By more accurately de-
fining “employee” and “employer” to track control over wage setting and
workers’ ability to counteract employer buyer power, the Board could better
adhere to the NLRA’s purposes and broader efficiency and distributive goals
of labor policy in an era of inequality.
349. See e.g., Cases of Interest: McDonald’s, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov
/cases-decisions/cases/cases-and-organizations-interest?organization=%22McDonald%27s%22
[https://perma.cc/G3QV-SBPQ]; Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 14-cv-02096, 2017 WL
950986 (N.D. Cal. March 10, 2017).
350. For such provisions in franchising agreements, see Rachel Abrams, Why Aren’t
Paychecks Growing?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/09/27/business/pay-growth-fast-food-hiring.html [https://perma.cc/7D3L-JE56]. See
also Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786 (S.D. Ill. 2018); Deslandes v.
McDonald’s U.S.A., L.L.C., No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL 3105955 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 25, 2018); WHITE
HOUSE, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THEUSAGE, POTENTIAL ISSUES, AND STATE
RESPONSES 5 (2016); OFF. OF ECON. POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., NON-COMPETE
CONTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2016).
351. Id.; see also Posner, supra note 10; On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A
Growth Theory of Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 833 (2013).
352. For wage penalties, see supra note 229.
353. See Callaci, supra note 33; SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO, MARC DOUSSARD, DAVE GRAHAM-
SQUIRE, KEN JACOBS, DAN THOMPSON & JEREMY THOMPSON, UC BERKELEY LAB. CTR., FAST
FOOD, POVERTYWAGES: THE PUBLIC COST OF LOW-WAGE JOBS IN THE FAST-FOOD INDUSTRY
(2013), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2013/fast_food_poverty_wages.pdf [https://perma
.cc/HLP2-96Z8]; Leslie Patton, McDonald’s Franchisees Rebel as Chain Raises Store Fees,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 6, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-
06/mcdonald-s-franchisees-go-rogue-with-meetings [https://perma.cc/L4K7-C7NY].
354. The Supreme Court recognized this in its foundational case upholding the FLSA’s
constitutionality. W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (noting that
“[w]hat . . . workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called upon to pay” and allowing employers
to pay workers low wages amounts to “a subsidy for unconscionable employers”).
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B. Equal Bargaining Power Analysis of Workers’ Substantive Rights Under
Section 7
The NLRB could also better fulfill the Act’s equal bargaining power pur-
pose by calibrating workers’ protected coordinated action to that goal. Spe-
cifically, the Board should tailor workers’ rights to collectively bargain and
engage in protected concerted activity to ensure effective countervailing
power by determining that the NLRA protects all concerted activity, includ-
ing activity engaged in during collective bargaining, unless doing so would
give workers unequal bargaining power relative to employers. This approach is
consistent with NLRA section 13, which guarantees an effective right to
strike, mandating that nothing in the Act “shall be construed . . . to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the
limitations or qualifications on that right.”355
Under current law, the Board takes no consideration of whether restrict-
ing section 7-protected conduct creates a bargaining power imbalance.356
The Board and the courts have instead justified restricting workers’ concert-
ed activity based on conclusory determinations—ungrounded in social sci-
entific analysis—that allowing certain forms of union activity would allow “a
union to do what we would not allow any employer to do, that is to unilater-
ally determine conditions of employment.”357 But, as previously discussed,
employers are given many opportunities under existing law to unilaterally
determine conditions of employment, and during strikes they have a range
of “self-help” measures to defeat strike pressure. The structural differences in
bargaining between labor and employers invites an evidence-based, rather
than formal and procedural “equality”-based, approach that furthers the
NLRA’s equal bargaining power goal. It is thus imperative that the Board
conduct informed assessments of the relative bargaining power of capital
and labor to ensure that its regulation of workers’ concerted activity accords
with that goal.
A couple examples illustrate the superiority of applying an equal bar-
gaining power framework relative to existing law. One of workers’ most po-
tent weapons against employers is unprotected inside action, or occupying
employer work spaces—the very positions struck—by, for example, engaging
in slowdowns.358 Slowdowns occur when workers take more time to perform
assigned tasks, joining together to regulate their pace by “enacting their own
norms concerning a fair day’s work.”359 Under current law, all such inside
355. 29 U.S.C. § 163; NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233–35 (1963).
356. But see supra text accompanying notes 166–172.
357. See, e.g., Valley City Furniture Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1589, 1595 (1954).
358. See Richard S. Hammett, Joel Seidman & Jack London, The Slowdown as a Union
Tactic, 65 J. POL. ECON. 126, 126 (1957).
359. James Gray Pope, Class Conflicts of Law II: Solidarity, Entrepreneurship, and the
Deep Agenda of the Obama NLRB, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 653, 679–80 (2009).
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actions are unprotected.360 Determining whether workers are engaging in a
slowdown is notoriously difficult: “Slowdowns” relative to what? In the de-
fining NLRB case, an employer unilaterally reduced lumber car loaders’ pay
from $2.71/hour to $1.525/hour, claiming loading had become easier.361 To
match this unilateral reduction, the workers loaded only one car per day, the
quota at surrounding plants and one they believed was a “good day’s work”
for that pay.362 The employer terminated those workers even though it had
no explicit production standard or output quota, and the Board upheld the
discharges, holding “slowdowns” unprotected.363 Historically, workers in
trades controlled “their own norms and customs of work, . . . undercut[ting]
the expectations and formal rules of employers.”364 But the Board here re-
moved as inappropriate for worker “consideration, discretion, or participa-
tion” any calibration of their productivity based on “fairness.”365 Thus, with
respect to “slowdowns”—or, to avoid weighted characterizations, union
“counteroffers”—the Board took no consideration of the employer’s bargain-
ing power in unilaterally asserting a reduced pay scale relative to workers’
ability to ensure any comparable holdout power.
In fact, inside-action “counteroffers” may be the most efficient and per-
haps only means for workers to assert countervailing power against wage-
setting employers. For non-consumer-facing industries and employers, or
employers for whom an external-facing picket line would do little to exert
economic pressure, inside action may be the most effective form of concert-
ed activity among few, if any, options. For example, in the summer of 2019,
American Airlines mechanics purportedly engaged in a slowdown by declin-
ing overtime and slowing plane repairs.366 The mechanics’ union and Ameri-
can reached a collective bargaining impasse after American merged with US
Airways. The union insisted on preserving premerger work from outsourc-
ing, premerger healthcare benefits, and parity in benefits between the two
360. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
361. Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 335 (1950).
362. Id. (quoting the workers’ testimony).
363. Id. at 335–36.
364. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES ANDASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 51 (1983).
365. Id. at 51–53.
366. Louis C. LaBrecque & Andrew Wallender, American Airlines Mechanics’ Slowdown
Nixed by Federal Court (1), BLOOMBERG L. (June 17, 2019, 6:43 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/american-airlines-mechanics-slow-down-
blocked-by-federal-court [https://perma.cc/B6GU-JV8F]. The example is merely illustrative
because the labor dispute is governed by the Railway Labor Act (RLA). 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188.
The RLA parallels the NLRA’s requirements in most ways but establishes extensive mandatory
dispute-resolution mechanisms that limit self-help options through strikes during a period of
negotiation and mediation. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v. United States Transp. Un-
ion, 396 U.S. 142, 148–49 (1969). It grants employers injunctive relief but allows broader forms
of concerted activity than the NLRA to accelerate the end of the dispute once major dispute
mechanisms are exhausted. See Trans World Airlines v. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants, 489
U.S. 426, 439 (1989).
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premerger workgroups.367 American, for its part, sought work and head-
count reductions, elimination of premerger healthcare choices, and mainte-
nance of the premerger profit-sharing formula the union claimed was
among the worst of peer airline employers.368 A federal judge granted Amer-
ican a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing the union from “any
form of interference with American’s airline operations.”369 The judge held
that American would suffer irreparable harm to its reputation and customer
goodwill from the slowdown, the public would be harmed by deprived
transportation, and the TRO’s harm to the union would be “inconsequen-
tial” by comparison.370 When it appeared the union did not comply with the
TRO, the judge modified it to impose additional requirements, including or-
dering senior union leaders to conduct in-person group meetings with me-
chanics and all union officials with “representatives of American
management . . . monitor[ing] compliance,” and if unable to do so, com-
municate by telephone “a sincere and emphatic respect for the [TRO’s] re-
quirements” and an imperative of total compliance “subject to . . . fines or
discipline.”371 Union leaders were also ordered to require each of their mem-
bers to sign and date an acknowledgment form.372 The court did no analysis
of labor-market conditions or the parties’ relative bargaining power. The un-
ion and American remain at an impasse as of this writing, suggesting that
the court’s resolution failed to promote labor peace and efficiency.
Under an equal bargaining power analysis on similar facts with NLRA-
protected workers, whether the slowdown constituted protected “concerted
activity” would turn on the parties’ relative market power. The evaluation
would begin with the fact that negotiations occurred right after the 2014
American-US Airways merger in an already highly consolidated industry.
While the DOJ was obligated under its Merger Guidelines to consider buyer-
power effects in its merger review, it had not yet taken its current vocal
stance on evaluating labor market-concentration effects from proposed mer-
gers.373 Significant evidence emerged that airlines have been able,
367. Michael Arria, American Airlines Mechanics Threatening the “Bloodiest, Ugliest Bat-




369. Temporary Restraining Order, Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, No.
4:19-cv-00414-A (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2019), ECF No. 65, ¶¶ 6–7.
370. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7.
371. Modifications to June 14, 2019 Temporary Restraining Order at 2–3, Am. Airlines,
Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, No. 4:9-cv-00414-A (N.D. Tex. Jul. 10, 2019), ECF No. 111.
372. Id. at 3–4.
373. Neither did it analyze labor-market effects in public documents approving the mer-
ger. See Final Judgment, United States v. US Airways Grp., Inc., No. 1:13-cv-01236-CKK
(D.D.C. Apr. 25, 2014), ECF No. 170. For Merger Guideline requirements, see HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 339, § 12. For antitrust agencies’ current stance, see supra
note 239. These positions remain lip service; the DOJ’s recent Sprint–T-Mobile merger ap-
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postmerger, to more easily collude, raise consumer prices and ancillary fees
(like baggage fees), and tighten capacity.374 While the union members were
highly skilled, and so had higher bargaining power because of their relatively
inelastic supply, the consolidation of six legacy carriers to three resulted in a
significant increase in the merged airline’s buyer power. And American ex-
plicitly sought to reduce labor inputs in its bargaining negotiations.375 Union
bargaining power was also constrained by law: workers had limited access to
strike protections, and unprotected inside action was one of few, if costly,
tactics of bargaining leverage available. American also had significant bar-
gaining power due to its unilateral decisionmaking power to outsource
maintenance and access injunctive relief against the union. The union did
not have comparable injunctive rights because of procedural strictures and
its insistence on merely permissive bargaining subjects: American had no
duty to bargain about its merger decision or the merger’s effects on em-
ployment conditions.376 The Board or the court could also evaluate competi-
tive wage rates, or labor’s MRP, pre- and postmerger, but could also consider
labor and behavioral-economics benchmarks of “fair wages” relative to in-
dustry wages and profit-sharing agreements. If American had buyer power
to price below industry standards, that would be sufficient to find it had
higher bargaining power relative to workers.
A bargaining-power test could also transform intermittent-strike analy-
sis. The NLRB recently held that Walmart did not violate the NLRA when it
disciplined and discharged employees who participated in a five- to six-day
work stoppage during their “Ride for Respect” to Walmart’s shareholders’
meeting.377 Organization United for Respect (OUR) Walmart organized the
work stoppage with support from the United Food and Commercial Work-
ers Union (UFCW), and it was one in a series of four actions, timed three to
proval made no assessment of labor market-concentration effects nor did it require labor mar-
ket-specific remedies in its conditions, despite deep concerns. See [Proposed] Final Judgment,
United States v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 1:19-cv-02232 (D.D.C. July 26, 2019), ECF No. 2-
2; ABDELA & STEINBAUM, supra note 229.
374. See, e.g., Yunzhou Zhang & Linda Nozick, Investigating Pricing Impacts of the Amer-
ican Airlines and US Airways Merger, TRANSP. RSCH. REC., December 2018, at 15; José Azar,
Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN.
1513 (2018); 2014 Airline Financial Data, BUREAU TRANSP. STAT. (May 5, 2015), https://www
.bts.gov/newsroom/2014-airline-financial-data [https://perma.cc/9P24-D56P]; JAY SORENSEN,
IDEAWORKS CO., THE CARTRAWLER YEARBOOK OF ANCILLARY REVENUE 5 (2015),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2986625/2015-Ancillary-Revenue-Yearbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JM87-WUD2]; Volodymyr Bilotkach & Paulos Ashebir Lakew, On Sources of
Market Power in the Airline Industry: Panel Data Evidence from the US Airports, 59 TRANSP.
RES. PART A 288 (2014); see also Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, In re Do-
mestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2656, Misc. No. 15-1404 (CKK) (D.D.C. Mar.
25, 2016), ECF No. 91.
375. See LaBrecque &Wallender, supra note 366.
376. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 473 F.2d
549, 555–60 (1st Cir. 1972).
377. Walmart Stores, Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 24, slip op. at 1–4 (2019).
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six months apart. These included (1) brief 2012 local work stoppages by 58
Los Angeles-area employees on October 4, demonstrations at Walmart’s Ar-
kansas headquarters on October 9–10, and a spontaneous one-day strike by
several employees in Walmart’s Lancaster, Texas, store on November 16; (2)
a nationwide Black Friday strike in 2012; (3) the Ride for Respect in May
2013; and (4) a nationwide Black Friday strike in 2013.378 Of Walmart’s 1.3
million employees at over 4,000 stores employing an average of 300 employ-
ees each, 8 employees at any given store struck; the Ride for Respect included
between 100 to 130 employees overall from about 50 stores, so only 1 or 2
employees left work from any particular store for the Arkansas trip.379 No
Walmart stores were forced to close because of the work stoppage, the strik-
ers received no compensation from Walmart, and Walmart reassigned other
employees to cover strikers’ work.380 Participating workers gave Walmart
advanced notice of their work stoppage.381
The Board held that the Ride for Respect was an “intermittent” strike in
a dramatic expansion of intermittent-strike doctrine. Specifically, it held that
any concerted activity that constitutes a “plan to strike, return to work, and
strike again” as part of “a strategy to use a series of strikes in support of the
same goal” is an unprotected intermittent strike, regardless of how far apart
in time or whether the “same goal” concerned basic employment issues like
improving wages and working conditions.382 What mattered to the Board
was “direct evidence” of union intent, in one post-strike statement, to use a
strategy of a series of strikes: “[T]he UFCW and OUR Walmart intend to
continue planning and assisting Walmart workers in striking in a manner
consistent with the strikes that [we] helped plan and assist Walmart workers
hold in October and November 2012, June 2013, and November 2013.”383
The Board conducted no analysis of whether the strikes exerted over-
whelming power over Walmart such that they gave workers unequal bar-
gaining power, rejecting past precedent that required effects-based analysis
of whether the strikes “harass[ed] the company into a state of confusion.”384
And the Board went further, anchoring its reasoning on the fact that the
strike threatened to disrupt the employer’s higher bargaining position and
access to economic weapons to secure it: “This random economic warfare
deprives employers of their responsive defense of permanently replacing
378. Id. at 1, 5 n.5.
379. Id. at 5–6.
380. Id. at 6.
381. Id. at 5.
382. Id. at 1 (quoting Farley Candy Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 849, 849 (1990)).
383. Id. at 1–2. Dissenting Member Lauren McFerran rejected the new standard as con-
trary to precedent and argued that the evidence did not even support an “intermittent strike”
finding under the new standard because it showed that plans for the Ride began forming in
early 2013, and the statement referred only to future intentions rather than past designs. Id. at
10–11 (McFerran, Member, dissenting).
384. Id. at 3 (citing Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1547 (1954)).
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strikers. . . . [A] genuine economic strike involves employees fully withhold-
ing their labor in support of demands . . . until their demands are satisfied or
they decide to abandon the strike.”385
The Board thus appeared to deploy a test mandating preservation of
higher employer bargaining power, finding workers’ concerted activity un-
protected unless it makes workers vulnerable to permanent replacement,
even if the strike has no impact on the employer’s business.
Within an equal bargaining power framework, the question of whether
intermittent strikes are protected would turn on an analysis of the actual
sources and effects of the parties’ relative bargaining leverage. Here,
Walmart may have significant buyer power depending on the struck store’s
location, particularly in rural labor markets.386 In addition, the evidence
showed that the Ride for Respect, singly and in succession with the other ac-
tions, had marginal if no impact on Walmart’s bargaining leverage: the un-
ion notified the employer in advance, and the employer was entitled to
permanently replace economic strikers. There was no evidence the displaced
work even raised Walmart’s labor costs in overtime pay for nonstriking
workers or in recruiting, hiring, or training strike-replacement workers. Dis-
senting Member McFerran summarized: “Only a small percentage of
[Walmart]’s employees participated. Each store lost a marginal number of
staff . . . , and [Walmart] did not have to close any stores. Indeed, . . .
[Walmart had] advance notice of the work stoppage, giving it sufficient time
to prepare for any interruption to its operation.”387
The nature of the work and labor supply here is also relevant: access to a
highly elastic supply of low-skilled strike replacements gave Walmart signifi-
cant bargaining power over strikers. Thus, there was no evidence that the
strike functioned to assert effective countervailing power in the first in-
stance, or that it placed Walmart in so weak a bargaining position relative to
the union that the union had unequal bargaining power.
C. Equal Bargaining Power Analysis of Employers’ Unfair Labor Practices
Finally, the Board should tailor both its ULP determinations and its sec-
tion 8 remedies to ensure equal bargaining power between workers and em-
ployers. Under an equal bargaining power analysis, the Board could draw on
social scientific theory and research to more accurately align the structural
relationship between labor and capital. Specifically, the Board should only
find a ULP where conduct tips the scales in favor of one party such that, were
the parties to enter a collective bargaining negotiation, they would be on une-
385. Id. at 3.
386. See, e.g., Barry C. Lynn, The Case for Breaking Up Walmart, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr.
29, 2013, 3:00 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/the-case-for-breaking-up-walmart/
[https://perma.cc/R58M-G39P]; Alessandro Bonanno & Rigoberto A. Lopez, Wal-Mart’s Mo-
nopsony Power in Metro and Non-metro Labor Markets, 42 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 569
(2012).
387. Walmart Stores, slip op. at 7 (McFerran, Member, dissenting).
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qual footing. To the extent the Board finds that a ULP places one party in a
position to hold out longer than the other, it should tailor its remedies to
correct for that imbalance.
As discussed, the Board has interpreted section 8 ULPs and exercised its
remedial authority in a formalistic way, without analyzing how those inter-
pretations or remedies impact parties’ relative bargaining power. Currently,
it is a ULP for employers to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
their exercise of section 7 rights; to dominate or interfere with a union to
form a “company union”; to discriminate or condition employment terms
on union membership; to retaliate against employees for filing charges or
testifying before the NLRB; and to refuse to bargain collectively with a union
that has achieved section 9(a) majority support.388 Unions commit ULPs if
they restrain or coerce employees in their exercise of section 7 rights or their
employer in selecting representatives for collective bargaining; cause an em-
ployer to discriminate against employees based on union membership; re-
fuse to bargain collectively with an employer as a certified representative of
its employees; engage in secondary activity against those who deal with their
employer; impose excessive or discriminatory union fees; exact payment
from employers for services not to be performed; or engage in certain kinds
of recognitional picketing.389 The Board is generally empowered to prevent
persons from engaging in ULPs, issue complaints, determine that a ULP has
been committed after a hearing, and petition federal courts to enforce its or-
ders.390 It is required to prioritize union ULPs of secondary boycotts and
recognitional picketing over others and petition a district court to enjoin
them.391
But adopting a social scientific and data-driven approach to ensuring
equal bargaining power could dramatically transform existing doctrine to
correct power imbalances in labor markets. Recent doctrine on exempting
employers from ULPs due to legal determinations of “disloyalty” is illustra-
tive. In a recent case pertinent to the current social-media environment, Mi-
kLin Enterprises v. NLRB,392 a Jimmy John’s franchisee sought an exception
for a ULP finding after it fired employees for engaging in consumer-facing
poster campaigns against its sick-leave policy. The Eighth Circuit held that
the franchisee did not commit a ULP when it discharged the employees for
“disloyal” conduct.393 The facts are telling. The discharged employees had
sought paid sick leave and designed and distributed posters on community
bulletin boards in their employer’s stores. The posters featured two identical
images of a Jimmy John’s sandwich with text above the first image reading,
“Your sandwich made by a healthy Jimmy John’s worker,” and text above the
388. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
389. Id. § 158(b).
390. Id. § 160 (a)–(j).
391. Id. § 160(l).
392. 861 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2017).
393. MikLin Enters., 861 F.3d 812.
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second reading, “Your sandwich made by a sick Jimmy John’s worker,” with
text below both reading, “Can’t tell the difference? That’s too bad because
Jimmy John’s workers don’t get paid sick days. Shoot, we can’t even call in
sick . . . We hope your immune system is ready because you’re about to take
the sandwich test.”394 The posters implied that, because of the employer’s
sick-leave policy, customers may be exposed to unsafe food because workers
would be unable to stay home when ill. The employer then proposed a new
sick-leave policy that required employees to find replacements to receive
pay, and the workers publicly distributed the same posters with an additional
line of text: “Let [the employer] know you want healthy workers making
your sandwich!”395 The employer fired six employees and issued written
warnings to three workers, claiming the posters resulted in its “bom-
bard[ment] by phone calls” for around a month.396
The NLRB found that the employer committed a ULP by interfering
with employees’ right to engage in public communications about ongoing
labor disputes and was not entitled to the ULP “disloyalty” exception. Specif-
ically, it found that the posters were “clearly related to the ongoing labor dis-
pute” in that they targeted the employer’s paid sick-leave policy as opposed
to disparaging the employer or its product.397 Further, because there was no
evidence of a malicious motive or employee knowledge that the posters’
statements were false or made with “reckless disregard for their truth or fal-
sity,” they were not “so disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue as to lose the
Act’s protection.”398 The Eighth Circuit disagreed. It found that the posters
made a “disparaging attack upon the quality of the company’s product and
its business policies” and were “reasonably calculated to harm the company’s
reputation and reduce its income.”399 Specifically, it held that section 7 does
not protect workers’ appeals to third parties to improve their working condi-
tions to such an extent that would derogate from employers’ rights to fire
employees “for cause” under NLRA section 10(c).400 Because the posters
were timed with flu season and would likely “outlive . . . the labor dispute,”
the NLRA did “not protect such calculated, devastating attacks.”401 The court
further found that the “disloyalty” ULP exception is available even where
employee appeals have a clear nexus to labor disputes.402
394. Id. at 815–16 (emphasis omitted).
395. Id.
396. Id. at 817.
397. Id. at 818.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 819.
400. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
401. MikLin Enters., 861 F.3d at 825–26.
402. Id. at 821–22.
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This decision has been much criticized for its broad extension of the dis-
loyalty exception.403 Specifically, it has been attacked as conflicting with the
NLRA’s equal bargaining power purpose because it grants employers the
power to characterize a wide range of concerted activity as “disloyal,” thus
disarming section 7 and removing “from protection those economic weap-
ons that effectively garner public support and threaten to harm the employ-
er’s reputation and income.”404 And the court appeared to functionally
reinstate an at-will default rule by allowing termination solely at the employ-
er’s discretion—even during union organizing campaigns—by locating the
statutory basis of the disloyalty test in section 10(c), which allows “justified,”
“for-cause” employee discharge based on employers’ unilateral determina-
tions. The court did this without any analysis of the union statements’ verac-
ity, the statements’ impact on the employer’s business, the employer’s buyer
power as a franchisee, extant labor-market restraints (like noncompete pro-
visions), or the impact of broad-strokes regulation of union speech on union
bargaining leverage.405 Finally, both the Board and the court ignored a criti-
cal fact relevant for bargaining-power analysis: the information employees
conveyed was accurate and corrected for an information asymmetry that
benefited only the employer. The employees, by publicizing health risks that
made consumers vulnerable, made the market more efficient by disclosing
materially relevant information that enabled more informed choices about
where to work and eat. The labor law should be tasked with correcting for
such market failures above any vague categorizations of “disloyalty” that
permit employer discretion at significant social cost.
Thus, in MikLin, as in other contexts, the court found no employer ULP
even as the Board and the courts have been prohibitive when reviewing un-
ion ULPs. For example, as I have written elsewhere, workers’ secondary ac-
tivity against “transactional primary” employers—or firms that transact with
a direct employer and have market power in that employer’s labor or prod-
uct market—ought to be protected where workers’ concerted activity against
their direct employer alone would not exert countervailing power against
other wage-determining firms.406 Thus, whether those transactional prima-
ries are firms that agree to wage-fixing, no-poaching, or other horizontal re-
straints with a direct employer or other entities in that employer’s supply
403. See, e.g., Recent Case, Labor Law—Employee Disloyalty—Eighth Circuit Holds Em-
ployee Organizing Activity Unprotected for Disloyalty Despite Lack of “Malicious Motive.”—
MikLin Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc), 131 HARV. L. REV.
1820, 1825 (2018).
404. Id. at 1826; see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Work-
place, 71 IND. L.J. 101, 133 (1995). By contrast, the Jefferson Standard disloyalty test is an “ob-
jective” test by which the Board may agree or disagree that employee expression deemed
disloyal by the employer was legitimate and therefore protected. NLRB v. Local Union No.
1229, Int’l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 475 (1953).
405. See supra note 350; Callaci, supra note 33.
406. Hafiz, supra note 136, at 1881–94.
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chain, workers should have an affirmative defense for picketing them just as
they would a direct employer.407
Labor law is the most important regulatory tool for ensuring that work-
ers exercise countervailing power against employers,408 and the Board should
use its remedial authority to correct unequal bargaining power in its ULP
remedies. For example, if employer conduct results in unequal bargaining
power, the Board should consider granting workers a default union, default
union bargaining, or to the extent a union is in place, a Board order enjoin-
ing collective bargaining under NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.409 And if workers
elect to form a union and their employers refuse to bargain on their first
contract—the most common impediment to successful collective bargain-
ing410—workers should also be entitled to a Gissel bargaining order and de-
fenses to concerted activity.411 Analysis for determining whether an
employer is acting in good faith could be informed by the employer’s buyer
power, social scientific data on the industry-specific value of incorporating
labor as a dynamic input of production, and the NLRA’s macroeconomic
goals. Similarly, analysis of and remedial options for employer ULPs could
be informed by buyer-power determinations and the extent of worker’s out-
side options.
CONCLUSION
This Article reconfigures labor regulation through a structural approach.
Where existing law has decentralized tools available to workers to exert
countervailing power against employer wage setting, adopting more aggres-
sive interpretations of the NLRA and utilizing more comprehensive reme-
dies to correct for unequal bargaining power will be necessary to rectify the
harms that result from employer control over the employment bargain. Inte-
grating social scientific theory, methods, and empirical analyses into the ju-
risdictional scope of labor law protections, analysis of workers’ concerted
activity, and sanctionable ULPs will allow better legal tracking of existing la-
bor-market conditions and determinants of labor’s share of national income.
And it will provide new lines of contestation concerning the rigor, accuracy,
and level of substantiation of Board and court labor-market regulation.
407. Id. at 1894.
408. See supra note 11.
409. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). See generally Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in
the Law of Workplace Cooperation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753 (1994); Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling
Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV.
655 (2010).
410. See Ross Eisenbrey, Employers Can Stall First Union Contract for Years, ECON. POL’Y
INST. (May 20, 2009), https://www.epi.org/publication/snapshot_20090520/ [https://perma.cc
/CAN3-7MHX]; Catherine L. Fisk & Adam R. Pulver, First Contract Arbitration and the Em-
ployee Free Choice Act, 70 LA. L. REV. 47 (2009).
411. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(5), 158(d).
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